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KAZAKHSTAN:

United States Engagement for Eurasian Security


by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in satisfaction of the requirements of the Advanced Research Program.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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KAZAKHSTAN
UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT FOR
EURASIAN STABILITY

KAZAKHSTAN

United States Engagement for Eurasian Security

Executive Summary

This paper researched the proposition that United States leadership in Central Asia is important to our national security strategy. It analyzed whether or not the United States should develop a tailored foreign policy for engaging the Republic of Kazakhstan. To accomplish that objective, the essay compared alternative policy options for advancing U.S. interests identified in the 1998 United States National Security Strategy For A New Century (NSS).

The premise of this analysis was that United States interests in Central Asia are important for a multitude of reasons, of which the primary include:

- Securing oil and gas development and export rights from the Caspian Sea.
- Supporting allies needs for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea region.
- Advancing the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
- Precluding the re-emergence of Russian hegemony in Central Asia.
- Strengthening Russia economically.
- Bolstering Turkish regional leadership.
- Deterring an expansion of a Chinese sphere of influence in Central Asia.
- Containing expansion of Iran and/or Afghanistan regional political influence.
- Preventing the spread of Islamic radical fundamentalism.
- Maintaining regional stability through regional leadership by a Central Asia republic favorable towards United States interests.

For the United States to be successful in pursuing a more effective foreign policy approach in Central Asia, a revised approach may be necessary. At least three factors appear to be relevant towards successful implementation of a revised Central Asian strategy. These were identified as the basic hypotheses of this essay and include:

1. Economic policies are the most effective foreign policy method for meeting U.S. objectives.
2. Increased diplomatic engagement is also necessary to provide a balanced U.S. foreign policy program in support of the NSS.
3. Based on its size, natural resources, ethnic population split, common border with both Russia and China, proximity to the Caspian Sea, and a demonstrated record of advancing market economics, the Republic of Kazakhstan may have the greatest potential for regional stability and for providing regional leadership favorable to U.S. interests in Central Asia.

The analysis portion of the essay addressed the three primary instruments of foreign policy engagement: diplomatic, economic, and military, to determine which may be the most effective to employ in shaping Kazakhstan. This research was conducted as a policy analysis, where an accumulation of empirical evidence is presented and evaluated against historical events to ascertain the relative success of previous policy decisions, providing a correlation to potential policy options for the United States in regards to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Finally, this essay provides recommendations for consideration which seek to redirect U.S. engagement in Central Asia by identifying the foreign policy instrument (diplomatic, economic, or military) with the most probable expectation for successful implementation.

The current NSS does not adequately recognize the strategic importance of Central Asia to stability in the Transcaspian region beyond the issues of oil and gas and WMD. With one of the world's largest oil reserves, located within a region which has the potential for activities that could be counterproductive to United States national interests, this essay postulates that the United States should more vigorously engage the Republic of Kazakhstan through a focused policy supportive of Kazakhstan independence and regional leadership; advancing political, economic, and military relationships which enhance United States interests in the region; strengthen Kazakhstan's regional position as a secular, democratic republic; and assisting Kazakhstan's transformation into a market economy.

This essay considered that one of the primary benefits of engaging Kazakhstan is directly related to its relationship with Russia and how that variable may be beneficial to United States long term interests within the region. Today, Kazakhstan maintains close relations with Russia, supplying a significant amount of food stuffs to Russia, providing the location for the Russian space launch facility, maintaining close military cooperation, and being one of the founders of the CIS. If the United States advances a program that minimizes the threats to Russia, and actually creates benefits that can be obtained by Russia, than engagement with Kazakhstan could become a key ingredient towards advancing Eurasian stability and a favorable world order. Engaging Kazakhstan does not need to be threatening to Russia.

Within Eurasia, Russia remains the dominate security interest for the United States. With U.S.-Russian relations deteriorating, the United States needs to develop a clear foreign policy direction towards Central Asia, which does not create the perception of aggression in Russia's "near abroad." The U.S. objective of engagement with Kazakhstan should go beyond existing programs to those which achieve regional stability in Central Asia and concurrently provide a means for the economic and political stabilization of Russia.

The United States recognized Kazakhstan with "Most Favored Nation" trading status in 1992 and subsequently increased foreign support. In 1994, the United States took another step towards developing a partnership with Kazakhstan by significantly increasing United States assistance by almost four times the previous annual level of \$91 million. The United States also offered an additional \$85 million for the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapon systems in Kazakhstan. In order to build security trust between Kazakhstan and western powers at a time when Kazakhstan was disarming nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, the United States signed the Memorandum of Security Decrees in Budapest in December 1994. But by 1995 the U.S. NSS still concentrated almost exclusively on the non-proliferation issue, addressing no other significant reasons why Kazakhstan had any strategic importance to the United States.

A prevailing position within the U.S. government is that U.S. engagement in Central Asia is

virtually irrelevant. This argument appears based upon a perception that the region is economically poor, has too many conflicting interests, is too far away from the United States to matter, and has not demonstrated an ability to really break away from Russia, or implement true democratic principles. To advocate that the United States not be actively involved in Central Asia risks U.S. interests. Simply doing nothing does not ensure that national interests will be sustained in a region where a variety of dynamic interests are being interplayed by a variety of nations. If the 1998 NSS is to be effectively implemented in Central Asia, than foreign policy changes must be made that avoid the conditions which foster the type of reactions currently being experienced in the Balkans. This would indicate that the U.S. may have to become more actively engaged in Central Asia early on to shape the stability of the region and to guide it in the economic development so necessary to maintaining security.

The second main objective of this essay was to identify the most favorable strategy for implementing U.S. foreign policies with Kazakhstan. This became the analytical portion of the report, attempting to illustrate that engagement with Kazakhstan has the potential for achieving U.S. interests while not creating greater negative unintended consequences that ultimately are not in the United States best interest in the world.

In his 1958 article "The Structure of Power in the American Society," C. Wright Mills argued that power in the United States is monopolized by three elites - military, economic, and political." His assessment of the power structure can be translated into the three contemporary instruments of foreign policy:

- Diplomatic
- Economic
- Military

Diplomatic engagement is the process by which a nation enters into government to government discussions to advance their own foreign policy agenda. The 1998 U.S. NSS identifies diplomacy as a vital tool for countering threats to our national security. Economic strategy is the

second instrument of foreign policy engagement. It involves the use of economic factors, such as commerce, trade, and foreign assistance programs directed towards a desired end-state which is favorable to the nations security interests. Use of the military is the third instrument available to a nation in pursuit of influencing the foreign affairs of another country. While traditionally use of the military has meant the application of force against another nations military, the military can also be used in a variety of less violent means, such as in providing military support, training, and counseling to developing nations; through arms sales and the weaponization of a country; and through treaties, agreements, and protocols which establish multi-national organizations and defense forces, such as in NATO. The 1998 U.S. NSS includes the use of military force as one of the primary methods available for shaping the international environment.

An analysis of these three instruments of foreign policy was conducted to ascertain which would be the most effective means for engaging Kazakhstan and shaping its development in a manner favorable to United States interests. A strategy analysis matrix was developed for comparing the relative success of each of the three instruments of foreign affairs in other historical events. This matrix was then used to ascertain which instrument of foreign engagement, or combination of instruments, has been most successful towards achieving U.S. interests in a situation similar to that faced today with the developing relationship with Kazakhstan.

The United States maintains that the primary objective of United States foreign policies in Central Asia is to ensure the newly independent republics remain independent. This goal is followed by the objective of instilling a democratic government that subscribes to international standards of the "rule of law." The U.S. has placed the implementation of democratic governance as a threshold criteria for relations with Kazakhstan. But the question remains: How should the United States promote democracy? Under U.S. philosophy, a nation needs to develop a strong democratic principle, based on the "rule of law" in order to be ready to expand market economics within the country. The position that the U.S. should not be actively engaged with a nation which has not institutionalized democratic principles, or eradicated human rights violations, is idealistic in a very

dynamic world. Kazakhstan has established significant trade relationships with Russia, and has maintained membership in the Common Defense Treaty with Russia. Pushing Kazakhstan too hard in pursuing democratic positions it is not ready to accept, may only result in driving Kazakhstan closer to Russia. Diplomatically, Kazakhstan understands that it has an alternative to U.S. pressure, unless there are returns to Kazakhstan that entice the leadership to be desirous of moving in a democratic fashion towards U.S. objectives. Diplomacy is important, but economics is more important to a country that is struggling economically and is unable to turn to its nearly bankrupt Russian neighbor for help. Linking economic policies to diplomatic policies, with economic programs being the lead instrument for engaging Kazakhstan has a clear benefit.

The current U.S. position assumes that democracy must be the premise from which economic reforms can be created that transform the republics into market economies. However, others argue that because the future direction and stability of the republics of Central Asia are so dependent upon the individual personalities of each republics leaders, engaging those leaders that have the greatest probability of success may actually facilitate eventual transformation to more democratic governments. There are strong examples on each side of the argument. Using the strategy matrix in this study, it would appear that the economic instrument, supported by a strong diplomatic efforts, may be the most effective means to accomplish that objective.

Advancing a strong economic policy, while reserving the right to apply diplomatic pressure in areas where democracy and the "rule of law" are not being implemented to the degree desired by the U.S., allows the U.S. flexibility to continue engaging developing nations in a direction favorable to U.S. interests. In accomplishing that objective, diplomatic engagement remains a valuable tool in potentially bolstering Kazakhstan as a regional leader, but uses economic engagement as the primary means to compel Kazakhstan to make the necessary institutional changes required to transform the republic towards democratic principles.

The idea of engaging a developing nation, like Kazakhstan, to bridge the chasm between the many diversified political interests of the United States in Russia, Asia, the Middle East, and across

the Transcaspian region is consistent with United States practices of the past. Not being engaged economically would be a bad decision, because direct involvement in the economic development of Kazakhstan and other republics of Central Asia will be a critical determinate on whether Russia reemerges as a hostile adversary to U.S. interests; whether Chinese influence expands westward; whether Islamic fundamentalism can be placed in check between Europe and Asia; and whether the future development of this natural resource rich region will be favorable to United States long term global interests. It is more probable that just the opposite is true, that engagement with Central Asia, and specifically through its economically and politically strongest republic will help shape the region in terms favorable to United States national interests.

This essay concludes that a more proactive economic program would provide the greatest ability to move the region towards market economics and democracy, basic global goals of the NSS. This can best be achieved in the short term by aggressive development of the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves, but only at the time that oil and gas prices can justify the investment requirements. Therefore, oil policy is not so much driven by diplomatic and military concerns, as it is by the marketplace. To provide a bridge in time for the right opportunity for oil and gas development, economic engagement with Kazakhstan can be achieved in other ways.

This essay examined U.S. engagement from a perspective that the United States not take on a dominant (imperialist) role in the region, but rather be actively engaged with one of the regions strongest emerging republics, Kazakhstan, to exert its leadership to maintain regional stability and advance a favorable regional order. In doing so, Kazakhstan can provide the conduit to assist Russia in ultimately achieving economic and political stabilization, while concurrently limiting the opportunity for China to include Central Asia within their sphere of influence, containing Iranian and radical Islamic fundamentalist expansionism, and creating greater market-driven economic opportunities for all Central Asian republics. While the establishment of democratic principles is by far the overarching objective of the United States in preserving a favorable world order and causing stability within the region, diplomacy alone can not accomplish that objective. Kazakhstan, like most

other republics of Central Asia remains a relatively poor country. However, in pressuring Kazakhstan to advance democracy, it needs to have the capability of surviving and the ability to exert its independence through self-reliance. This can only be accomplished through market reforms and the institutionalization of market economics.

Therefore, this essay has illustrated how the United States could improve its abilities to lead the Kazakhstan government towards a more democratic system, embracing the "rule of law" concept over centralized government controls, by structuring a program which provides tangible incentives for achieving these objectives. It has also provided evidence that an economic approach appears to be the most viable means for success, but that the economic approach should be woven with both a diplomatic and military aspect. To ignore Central Asia, or to conclude that U.S. engagement in Central Asia somehow will result in Russian resistance or develop unintended consequences that are contrary to U.S. interest in the region, is to accept an argument that Central Asia is just not of sufficient importance to the U.S. to risk the effort necessary to achieve these goals.

U.S. leadership in Central Asia is critical if long term U.S. interests are to be realized. Beyond the need for access to oil and gas and beyond the security issues of WMD and non-proliferation, Central Asia has the potential of contributing, either positively or negatively, towards the United States objective of world democratic countries that foster strong market economies. How the United States deals with Kazakhstan now will have long term implications on how that region of the world relates to United States interests in the future. If the United States becomes proactive with an economic policy that steers Kazakhstan in a manner favorable to United States interests, than it is highly likely that Chinese political influence in the region will not spread; Iranian radical fundamentalism will be contained; Central Asia will remain an independent, stable region with developing economic markets tied to western interests; Russia will benefit from an economically strong neighbor that maintains close relations; and Kazakhstan will slowly develop as a true democratic republic. These are the objectives that can be achieved with a strong United States economic program towards Kazakhstan.

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KAZAKHSTAN

United States Engagement for Eurasian Security

INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Henry Kissinger observed that "The importance of United States leadership is all the greater because many of the leaders of the newly independent nations have so little understanding of international relations and of the nature of power."¹ At the time of his writing, Kissinger was referring to the recent independence of many nations from European colonization. Today the parallels are all too obvious, as new independent countries have formed in Europe, the Caucasus, and across Central Asia as a result of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. "If, then, we are prepared to exercise leadership, we may be able to induce many of the newly independent nations to travel in a direction to which they already incline, if always a few steps behind us."² The need for United States leadership through engagement with these newly independent states may be even greater today for the preservation of peace and maintaining a favorable world order than at the time of Kissinger's writings because the United States has emerged as the sole world superpower and primary example of a successful democratic governance.

This paper is intended to research the proposition that United States leadership in Central Asia is important to our national security strategy and to analyze whether or not the United States should develop a tailored foreign policy for engaging the Republic of Kazakhstan. To accomplish this objective, the essay will compare alternative policy options for advancing U.S. interests as identified in the 1998 United States National Security Strategy For A New Century (NSS).

The premise of this analysis is that United States interests in Central Asia are important for a multitude of reasons, of which the primary include:

- Securing oil and gas development and export rights from the Caspian Sea.
- Supporting allies needs for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea region.
- Advancing the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
- Precluding the re-emergence of Russian hegemony in Central Asia.

- Strengthening Russia economically.
- Bolstering Turkish regional leadership.
- Deterring any expansion of a Chinese sphere of influence in Central Asia.
- Containing expansion of Iran and/or Afghanistan regional political influence.
- Preventing the spread of Islamic radical fundamentalism.
- Maintaining regional stability through regional leadership by a Central Asia republic favorable towards United States interests.

Current policies limit United States objectives of engagement and enlargement in Central Asia and Kazakhstan primarily towards the control of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear non-proliferation, and development of the oil and gas rich Caspian Sea region. While these issues are critically important to United States security, this may be too limited an approach to cover the vast potential interests of the United States; a world superpower that has emerged as one of the chief stabilizing forces in an otherwise very unstable world.

From the list above, five primary objectives for United States foreign policy intentions in Central Asia can be identified which might justify a greater level of engagement. They are:

1. Creating a stable and prosperous Central Asia which is favorable to United States trade and the security of the oil and gas development and exportation.
2. Filling the leadership power vacuum created by the demise of the former Soviet Union with a Central Asian republic favorably inclined towards United States interests.
3. Deterring Russian expansion back into the region.
4. Containing the spread of radical Islamic Fundamentalism and preclude the emergence of an Iranian/Afghanistan political hegemony in the region.
5. Limiting Chinese political influence in the region, while stimulating trade opportunities between Central Asian republics and China.

These five objectives reflect the United States position that a favorable world order and global economic security can best be achieved by advancing the development of Central Asia's republics towards western interests and defusing any potential for conflict over Central Asian interests.

In the same spirit as was identified by Henry Kissinger in the 1960's, the U.S. has a unique historical opportunity to provide global leadership in Central Asia, fostering closer ties with republics that demonstrate the strongest potential for independence and long term institutionalization of market economics and democracies. For the United States to be successful in pursuing a more effective foreign policy approach in Central Asia, a revised approach may be necessary. At least three factors appear to be relevant towards successful implementation of a revised Central Asian strategy. These are identified as the basic hypotheses of this essay and include:

1. Economic policies are the most effective foreign policy method for meeting U.S. objectives.
2. Increased diplomatic engagement is also necessary to provide a balanced U.S. foreign policy program in support of the NSS.
3. Based on its geographic size, natural resources, ethnic population split, common border with both Russia and China, proximity to the Caspian Sea, and a demonstrated trade record of advancing market economies, the Republic of Kazakhstan may have the greatest potential for regional stability and for providing regional leadership favorable to U.S. interests in Central Asia.

This essay will consider the proposition that it is in the United States foreign policy interests to be engaged in Central Asia, followed by a discussion of the potential importance Kazakhstan could play as a regional leader. The analysis portion of the essay addresses the three primary instruments of foreign policy engagement: diplomatic, economic, and military. The essay will analyze which may be the most effective instrument to employ in shaping Kazakhstan in a manner favorable to United States interests. This will be conducted as a policy analysis, where an accumulation of empirical evidence will be presented and evaluated against historical events to ascertain the relative success of previous policy decisions, providing a correlation to potential policy options for the United States in regards to Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Finally, this essay will provide recommendations for consideration which seek to redirect U.S. engagement in Central Asia by identifying the foreign policy instrument (diplomatic, economic, or military) with the most probable expectation for successful implementation.

WHY ENGAGE CENTRAL ASIA?

The U.S. NSS is meant to provide a comprehensive focus for the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. In doing so, it identifies U.S. national interests and provides policy guidance towards achieving these goals worldwide. It presents integrated regional approaches to "reflect our overall strategy tailored to unique challenges and opportunities."³ The first, and some would argue most important, security focus is directed towards Europe, where the NSS states that "stability is vital to our own security."⁴ Under the discussion of Europe, the NSS also includes security interests in Eurasia, which encompasses the republics of Central Asia. In doing this, the NSS combines a vast geographical area extending from the European Atlantic coast across Russia to the Pacific Ocean and southeasterly across the Caucasus Region and all of Central Asia to the border of China and Southwest Asia. This could be considered a policy guidance deficiency, because it includes an expansive, dissimilar geographical area which can not be assimilated under a single, unified security strategy, as the differences in U.S. interests between England, France, and Germany to such republics as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are significant. The result is a European centered approach where consideration of a strategy towards Central Asia becomes nothing more than a small subset to a region that has much greater interest to the United States, that of greater Europe.

The NSS provides a separate section pertaining to the Middle East, Southwest and South Asia, an area generally described as stretching from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea to India. This region, while still encompassing a large geographical area, includes countries with much closer historical, ethnic, and cultural similarities than is addressed in the Europe and Eurasia section. But here the NSS addresses interests beyond the region and includes consideration of U.S. interests in Central Asia. The NSS states that "Choices made in the Middle East, Southwest and South Asia will determine whether terrorists operating in and from the region are denied the support they need to perpetrate their crimes, whether weapons of mass destruction will imperil the region and the world, and whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia become reliable energy sources, whether the opium harvest in Afghanistan is eliminated, and whether a just and lasting peace can be established between Israel and the Arab counties."⁵

By bifurcating Central Asia interests between the interests of greater Europe, and those of the Middle East, and Southwest and South Asia, Central Asian policies are often directed more towards other objectives than towards Central Asian objectives. This split position can create conflicts in Central Asian policies. It appears this problem has been caused because U.S. strategists generally considered Central Asia with Russian foreign policy positions. This could be considered a potential flaw in creating a comprehensive foreign policy towards a region of the world which is in its infancy in developing independent democratic, market economies and just at a time when a concentrated U.S. effort may be most valuable. This essay offers the perspective that U.S. policies towards Central Asia may be more beneficial to U.S. interests if shaped to a much greater degree by the relationships Central Asian republics develop with each other and with their neighbors in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, than towards a European (Russian) centered policy.

Recognition of this policy gap can be seen by the recent shift in responsibility for Central Asia within the U.S. military from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). This action alone does not resolve the policy gap created by the bifurcated approach to Central Asia, as U.S. policy still has not identified a clear and comprehensive position towards Central Asia. It is for that reason that the premise of this essay is that a more focused approach is necessary for U.S. strategy to be successful in Central Asia and that failure to accomplish that objective risks U.S. interests in a multitude of areas. Therefore, the next section of this essay provides supporting rationale for why the U.S. should be more focused on relationships in Central Asia.

Russia: Since the mid 1800's, Central Asia has been closely guarded under the sphere of influence of the Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union. Today, most internationalists are well familiar with the regions exploitation by the former Soviet Union, ranging from nuclear weapons testing at Semipalatinsk; to expansive agricultural development projects along the northern steppe; to massive irrigation projects that are draining the Aral Sea; to natural resource exploitation in mining and manufacturing; to providing convenient locations for large prisons and camps for criminals and the politically incorrect. To the former Soviet Union, Central Asia was a place rich in natural

resources, close by, and available for exploitation. This past Soviet abuse left the newly independent republics of the region with very little usable infrastructure, limited markets for their products, and without a solid foundation from which to establish the government institutions necessary for the creation of independent nations.

The rapid demise of the former Soviet Union forced Central Asia to establish independent republics in a compressed time, with little external support. Compounding the problem has been Russia's near bankrupt economy, which is unable to provide a strong economic support for Central Asian states. In contrast to the time when Central Asia benefited from substantial economic exchange with Moscow, access to this past Soviet economic base has not only been significantly reduced, but Russia has become a competitor for foreign aid and resources. This left a vacuum in regional leadership, as Russia seeks to maintain an influence in an area traditionally tied close to the politics of Moscow but unable to provide the support needed to solidify national independence of the regions republics.

This vacuum has created different responses from within Central Asia, with some republics seeking to maintain close ties with Russia, while others are looking for ways to distance themselves from Russian domination and become more integrated into the international community as a distinct entity. The lack of superpower status and/or leadership associated with the FSU, as well as the concurrent struggle to retain a sphere of influence in Central Asia by Russia, has produced regional frictions which have the potential of slowing the expansion of market economic reforms and democratic governance across Central Asia while potentially developing into larger, more volatile conflicts if stable development and integration into the world community is not successful.

Russia remains interested in Central Asia. Central Asia, in many regards, may be the final sphere of influence where Russia retains a significant role. Russia's first priority in Central Asia is to preserve the CIS.⁶ Preservation of the CIS is based on the need to retain a close alliance with the post-Soviet republics and to ensure that Russia retains security and trading partners. Russia does not want to become an isolated nation and preservation of the CIS is viewed as a means to retain the image of a large superpower nation that has strong regional alliances. Additionally, the CIS is

intended to keep a bloc of nations supportive of Russian interests at least partially tied economically and politically to Moscow. The second priority is a continuing the interest for Russians living in the "Near Abroad."⁷ While the percentage of Russian populations in each of the Central Asian countries varies greatly, it remains a significant number. Since most countries of Central Asia are economically faring better than Russia, there has not been a substantial migration of Russians out of Central Asia. In fact, many of the Russians that initially migrated out of Central Asia back to Russia have started returning because of the severe economic conditions found in Russia. Third, Russia continues to be concerned about the decentralization of nuclear weapons and the ability of Central Asian countries to manufacture, sell, and utilize nuclear weapons.⁸ This is clearly the concern with Kazakhstan, which under the Soviet Union had a significant role in the nuclear program, from manufacturing weapons and nuclear materials, to testing nuclear weapons, to the stationing of nuclear ballistic missiles within the republic. Kazakhstan has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is a strong proponent of START II initiatives, causing Russia to be wary of Kazakhstans nuclear intentions. Forth, Russia is concerned about border security and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism.⁹ Finally, Russia is concerned that ethnic problems in Central Asia could spread to within the borders of Russia and stir conflict between the multiethnic groups that inhabit the vast Russian Federation.¹⁰ This could lead to internal conflict and a potential for a break-up of the Russian Federation.

But, Russia has also realized that it must be careful in pursuing its relationships with Central Asia. Central Asia has a significant Muslim population and in defining its position in the world, is attempting to balance its political and religious positions accordingly. Russia remains concerned about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, which could ravage its southern borders if allowed to infiltrate Central Asia. To counter that, Russia has been tolerant of religious freedoms in Central Asia, especially following its experience in the Afghanistan War, and has carefully watched to determine the degree to which Islam is being incorporated into governments of all the new republics. From the Russian viewpoint, its relationship with Kazakhstan has the most potential risk. With a common border exceeding 5,000 km, an Islamic government in Kazakhstan would be a serious threat

to Russian security and could undermine Russian foreign policy positions from Europe to Asia. Therefore, Russia is supportive of the current Kazakhstan administration.

Russia also recognizes that the large number of Islamic nations to their south can be used to their benefit. Friendly relations with Islamic states could provide an ability to undermine U.S. expansionism. For example, Russia and Iran are cooperating in many economic ventures in Central Asia. This has caused concern in Washington where it is viewed that any move by Russia to further solidify this relationship as counterproductive to the United States interests. For Russia, the goal is to check the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism away from the Russian border, while embracing the existence of Islamic nations that have the ability to counter the expansion of U.S. influence in the region. Therefore, to reduce Russian cohesion in Central and Southwest Asia, it may be more productive for the United States to demonstrate leadership by engaging Central Asia in a series of progressive initiatives designed to bolster their interests in pursuing western policies, as opposed to being reintegrated back into a tight Russia sphere of influence reminiscent of the Cold War era.

Central Asia remains of significant interest to Russia for other reasons too. Central Asia is still a primary import-export partner with Russia; Russia has been instrumental in negotiating many treaties and agreements which retain many of the former Soviet Union ties between the two regions; Russia continues to operate its fledgling space program from facilities in Kazakhstan; Russia recognizes the potential economic benefits from successful development and export of oil and gas reserves from the Caspian Sea region; and militarily, Russia continues to station troops within Central Asia, with the exception of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which provides for a projected defense.

China: Chinese interest in Central Asia stems from the historical relationship of the people of the Xinjiang-Uigher Autonomous region. Comprising almost one-sixth of China on the west and northwest, the Xinjiang region is distant from the Chinese central government. It is an ethnically mixed region, with Turkic as well as Chinese and Mongolian backgrounds. Until the mid 1800's, Xinjiang was autonomous, not fully incorporated into the Chinese government, but with close Chinese ties. In 1884 Xinjiang was formally incorporated into China.¹¹

For China, the interest in Central Asia today consists of regional security for the nation and the Xinjiang region, defined most clearly by a concern of Russian influence in Central Asia and Islamic expansionism. To China, the prospect of either radical religious governance or a resurgence of nationalism that could infiltrate into the Xinjiang region causes concern. The Chinese fear civil unrest, as is seen in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, could spill over into western China, destabilizing Beijing's control in the region.

To counter, China has enacted an economic approach towards Central Asia that seeks to stabilize the region and thwart any desire for expansion. To China, the most significant countries for engagement are Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Tajikistan, which all share common borders with China. One of the first conclusive ties between China and Central Asia was the opening of the Trans-Eurasian Railroad line between Kazakhstan and China in 1990, followed recently by an agreement to construct an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan into China.¹²

Economically, Xinjiang has been one of China's poorer regions.¹³ Xinjiang has turned to Central Asia for economic development by aggressively exporting, especially to Kazakhstan which was able to reciprocate by exporting tractors, fertilizers, and other goods required by this rural agricultural based region. Of all the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan has seen the greatest influx of Chinese. Having one of the stronger Central Asian economies and being directly adjacent to China has made travel between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang easy.

China has a tremendous need for energy. Kazakhstan has sufficient oil and gas reserves to meet many of China's needs, plus it has been aggressively seeking international markets for the export of oil and gas. China has seen this as an opportunity to expand relationships with Kazakhstan. However, for Kazakhstan, there is concern about competing Chinese and Russian interests. The government of Kazakhstan, aligned closely to Russia, is hesitant to move quickly towards relationships with China, as that may be perceived in Moscow as a negative, possibly anti-Russian, move. They fear close relations with China may encourage Chinese expansionism into Central Asia, which would threaten Kazakhstan's sovereignty. However, Kazakhstan recently concluded territorial boundary discussions with China which has apparently resolved past boundary disputes.

Kyrgystan is also interested in Chinese trade and developing relations which improve the economic independence of the republic. Kyrgystan currently produces excess energy from its hydroelectric facilities, excess power that could be used to benefit Chinese energy needs in western China. Therefore, Kyrgystan is also working with China on developing a more cooperative economic relationship.

But, China remains a significant concern. As pressures within China continue to grow for energy, food, and fertile land, Central Asian republics are concerned that China may decide to acquire the necessary resources and land by expanding westward. In response to this concern, Kazakhstan has concentrated fighter aircraft along the Kazakhstan - Chinese border. While the Kazakhstan Air Defense Forces may not maintain sufficient aircraft to engage China in a protracted conflict, the positioning of these aircraft across the border from China signifies the Kazakhstani concern about potential long term Chinese intentions.

Iran: Complicating the development of a U.S. strategy towards Central Asia is the fact that several states bordering Central Asia have goals adverse to U.S. interests. To allow these states to infiltrate their objectives into Central Asia politics could damage U.S. abilities to expand and enlarge democratic principles and free market economics in the region. This could also destabilize the region and create the potential for long term relations that are counterproductive to a favorable world order.

In addressing Eurasian stability, Iran is a distinct problem. Iran, once the regions strongest U.S. ally, quickly deteriorated into a hostile relationship following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. The United States broke off diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic after the forced occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by the Line of the Imam (the grand ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini). The Islamic Republic of Iran implemented a political agenda counter to United States interests in the region. In response, the United States adopted a policy of containment, eventually including Iraq in a dual containment policy following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, in spite of the on-going hostilities between the United States and Iraq, Iran remains the more significant regional problem for the United States. Iran maintains a hostile anti-western agenda,

notwithstanding recent attempts at reestablishing relationships with Italy and France, that seeks to destabilize and displace western (primarily United States) interests in the region.

Despite the economic embargo initiated by the United States, Iran is actively engaged in economic development programs designed to increase its influence within Central Asia. This is not to infer the Iranian economy is robust, in fact in the past year the Iranian economy has been in decline, which is cause for even greater concern for Iranian intention towards the republics of Central Asia. But, the Iranians desire to play a dominate role in Central Asia is continuing to evolve and this expansion not only conflicts with U.S. interests, but clashes with Turkish intentions, creating another strategy problem for the United States.¹⁴

The United States is rightly concerned about the rapid interest Central Asian republics have had in establishing relations with Iran. As early as March 1992, Turkmenistan entered into an economic agreement, valued at over \$80 million with Iran and became one of the first republics to work towards development of a rail link between Central Asia and Iran.¹⁵ This had been preceded by a visit to all five Central Asian capitals by Irans Foreign Minister, Vlayti in November 1991, where Iran pledged economic support and proposed development of an integrated transportation system that would link all of Central Asia to Europe and the Far East with Iran.¹⁶ Kazakhstan took the offer further and established agreements for trade with Iran, followed by an agreement to extend rail service through Turkmenistan. And Tehran, attempting to position itself as a regional leader, has played host to the Economic Cooperation Organization with the specific intention of gaining Central Asian states membership.

To counter U.S. policies regarding Iran, the Islamic Republic has focused on a foreign policy that engages Europe and Russia, in addition to its interests in Central Asia. The role of Europe is of vital importance in any Iranian economic, diplomatic or strategic planning. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War and the break up of the Soviet Union, the pursuit of improved relations with Russia, and the dividends encompassed in such a policy - i.e., access to modern military hardware and other types of modern technology has also become a key priority for Iran, and Russia has indicated a willingness to cooperate with Iran.

But closer relations with Europe and Russia still has problems based on the division of policy direction from within Iran. The continuation of the "Salman Rushdie" death decree, and the inability of the Iranian government to seriously detach itself from Ayatollah Khomeini's 'Fatwa', stifles British interest in normalizing relations with Iran. The continued involvement of Iran in acts of terrorism and murder, in the aftermath of the "Mykonos Trials", where a German court ruled that Iranian leaders had ordered the killing of four Kurdish dissidents in Berlin, has resulted in the issuance of an European Union (EU) statement condemning such policies of Iran. The U.S. continues to urge European countries to maintain economic pressures on Iran by limiting investments and other credits. President Clinton has stated that the U.S. government would not carry out the penalties envisioned in the "Iran-Libya Sanctions Act" (against the French Oil company TOTAL and its partners), the U.S. government, nonetheless, has reiterated its opposition to any pipeline project linking Central Asia to the Persian Gulf via Iran, and voiced its general disapproval of any new loans or major investment being made available to the Islamic government.¹⁷

The U.S. wants Iran to stop supporting international terrorism and terrorist organizations, stop opposing the Peace Process between the Arabs and the Israelis and above all, abandon its efforts at producing weapons of mass destruction such as an atomic bomb and ballistic missiles. For its part, Iran wants America to stop economic sanctions it has imposed on Iran, give back all Iranian assets "frozen" in the U.S. since the cutting off relations, recognize Islamic Republic's particularism and Iran's dominant position in the Persian Gulf. However, most Iranian analysts think even if some clerics in Iran wanted to open up dialogue with Washington, the forces that are against the United States remains strong enough to stop any talks with Washington. "The fact is that even if the conservatives wanted to accept some degree of political pragmatism, yet forces that operates behind the curtains will never ever allow the chains to be broken", said Dr. Hatam Qaderi, a Professor of Political Science at Tehran University.¹⁸

Not all Iranian relations with Central Asia are good either. Protest by Iran against the trial of five people accused of violent Islamic activities against Uzbekistan deteriorated further the already cold relations between Tehran and Tashkent.¹⁹ Uzbekistan is concerned that terrorists groups have

received training in urban guerrilla and propaganda warfare in Iran. Uzbekistan has responded by cracking down on radical fundamentalist groups, which has aggravated Iran. The Voice of the Islamic Republic explained that Uzbekistan's crack down on the Uzbek Muslim people is the result of President Karimov's inability to distinguish between Muslims and fundamentalists. What made Tehran more angry with Uzbekistan was a new law passed by the parliament aimed at giving security forces more freedom to fight all Islamist fundamentalist organizations.²⁰

Iran's initiatives also suffered a set back with Turkmenistan which used to have the closest ties with Iran. Turkmen president Sapar Murat Niazov negotiated an agreement with U.S. oil companies in 1998 covering the transport of Turkmen gas and oil via the Caspian Sea directly to Azerbaijan instead of using an Iranian pipeline, potentially depriving Iran of hundreds of millions in royalty revenues.²¹

These events demonstrate the difficulties still present with regards to Iranian relations and the mixed foreign agenda that permeates all foreign affairs regarding that country. Iran, while interested in expanding influence into Central Asia, and with recent success in regards to economic initiatives within the region, remains a dysfunctional state that is inconsistent in applying its foreign policy program and continues to face opposition to world integration by the United States.

Afghanistan: Afghanistan is another potential destabilizing force for Central Asia. Torn by a century of civil strife, and extensive battles against external forces during the period of the Great Game, Afghanistan remains an unstable, radical fundamentalist state. The relationship between Afghanistan and Central Asia is complicated. Valery V Tsepkalo, in his article The Remaking of Eurasia, states:

"Developments in neighboring Afghanistan, torn by a century of civil strife, may have particularly powerful reverberations. So long as former President Mohammad Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, relying mainly on ethnic Tajiks, and General Abdul Rashid Dostam, a Uzbek, held the northern part of the country, with Russian border guards protecting the frontier with Tajikistan and neutralizing the Tajik opposition, the situation in the region was unhappy but predictable. But when the militant theology students, backed by Pakistan, overthrew Dostam, panic broke out in both Central Asia and Russia. The Taliban were driven out of the north, and everyone calmed down a bit. But Afghan politics is an unpredictable

seesaw. If the Taliban find an ally among the other armed Afghan groups and Russia further reduces its presence in the region, zealous and battle-hardened Taliban troops could invade Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Worse, the Taliban could reach an agreement with Tajikistan's opposition Islamic Renaissance Party. Then Uzbekistan, with its historic Tajik centers of Bukhara and Samarland would be in danger."²²

So much for those that dismiss Afghanistan and Islamic fundamentalism as a serious problem. In fact, to emphasize the importance of this problem, it has been reported that the anti-U.S. international terrorist Osama bin Laden was behind the financing of the assassination attempt of the Uzbekistan president on February 15, 1999.²³

Turmoil in Afghanistan continues to impact stability with the region. Even the developing peace does not mollify Iranian intentions towards the region. Iran initially expressed satisfaction at the peace agreements, saying "The Islamic Republic of Iran hopes that the accord will pave the way for a lasting peace in Afghanistan, helping the warring factions to form a "broad basis with the participation of all tribes and ethnic groups of Afghanistan and form an independent, popular and non-engaged government." Iran cautioned its support by stating an indirect, but clear hint that it was Tehran's desire to see an "Afghanistan not dependent to the great U.S. Satan and it's Pakistani ally in this part of Asia."²⁴ Thus illustrating the continued complexity of U.S. relations with both Iran and Afghanistan.

A stabilized Afghanistan potentially means pipe lines carrying gas and oil from Turkmenistan, and possibly Kazakhstan, to the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan and Pakistan instead of through Iran. These projects, backed by Washington and favored by some U.S. oil companies, would deprive Iran of the subsequent royalties. Iran recognizes this problem. Iran cautioned that peace in Afghanistan may have a negative impact to Iran, especially "if the Ashgabat "breakthrough" becomes reality, as it will have a huge economic and financial fallout, since it should logically be followed by the construction of an oil and gas pipe line linking Turkmenistan energy fields to the Pakistani port of Karachi via Afghanistan, putting an end to Iranian efforts to become the central route for the transit of oil and gas from Central Asian nations to the Persian Gulf in one side and Europe on the other."²⁵

The domination of Afghanistan by the staunchly anti-Shi'a Taliban also means a direct security threat to the stability of Iran where the Sunni population estimated at some 20 millions out of 63 millions inhabitants and living in majority at Iran borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan - as well as with Turkmenistan in the North and Iraq in the West - are treated harshly by the ruling Shi'a clerics.

The United States has been cautious in regards to Afghanistan involvement in Central Asia. However, the importance of regional stability makes it in the U.S. interest to foster an Afghanistan that is not dominated by Iran, and is supportive of a pipe line access route, via the Indian Ocean, for transporting Central Asian oil and gas to the world markets.

Turkey: Notwithstanding past historical relations between Turkey and Central Asia, Turkish interest in Central Asia today stems from a variety of national interests that are redefining Turkey's position in world politics. Following World War II, the European community welcomed Turkey as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Turkey provided the eastern edge against potential aggression of the former Soviet Union. However, in other areas Turkey has not been openly accepted as a European state, most recently demonstrated by the European Union's rejection of Turkey's membership application. Due, in part to the inability to fully integrate into the European circle, Turkey, has once again turned its attention east, towards the Caucasus region and Central Asia.²⁶ "For Turkey, the chief motivation for wanting to develop political ties with Central Asia was its perception of its own isolation and the unreliability of its allies."²⁷ This was stated in 1994, and only proven more valid in 1997 when the EU again rejected Turkey's application of admission, which was first submitted in 1989.

Central Asia has ethnic ties with Turkey that predate modern relationships with Europe. Economically, Turkey was one of the first foreign powers to start investing in Central Asia following the collapse of the FSU. Turkey has forged strong economic and cultural bonds with Central Asia, with significant investments in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It has provided \$80 million in humanitarian aid.²⁸ Turkey provided early investment credits to Central Asian countries, totaling \$610 million by 1994, with another \$310 million available for loan through the Turkey Eximbank.²⁹

Turkey is also involved in over 100 joint ventures in Kazakhstan, including financial backing of the newest and largest hotel in Almaty.³⁰ The Turkish national telephone company, PTT installed public telephones in all five of the Central Asian countries soon after independence in order to gain leverage in establishing Central Asian connections through the Turkish system.³¹ Turkish Airlines was one of the first international carriers outside the FSU to initiate scheduled air service to Central Asian capital cities.

Turkey is also actively pursuing both gas and oil pipelines from Azerbaijan, through or around Armenia, to the Mediterranean port at Ceyhan. In doing this, Turkey seeks to bypass the problematic Black Sea access routes and provide a quicker, more secure route to world markets for the gas and oil reserves of the entire Caspian Sea region. This has benefits for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which have abundant Caspian Sea reserves and require multiple access routes for export of their gas and oil because of their landlocked locations.

According to Deputy Secretary Talbott, Turkish engagement in Central Asia has a benefit of impacting Russian engagement in the area. He argues that the Russians fear a growing involvement by Turkey because it might cut Central Asian republics off from the former Soviet Union and weaken Russian influence in the area.³² But there are also other concerns Turkey has for seeking closer ties with Central Asian republics. Turkey has seen significant turmoil close to their borders. From Saddam Hussein's rogue activities of Iraq and ethnic problems of the Kurds in northern Iraq, to the religious extremism in Iran, to the territorial struggle with Greece, and the more recent ethnic unrest and civil turmoil in the Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, Turkey has recognized its security problem of potentially being an isolated state in a volatile region with some very unpredictable neighbors. This coupled with its delicate balance of internal religious and political differences has forced Turkey to be proactive in establishing relationships that benefit Turkish long term goals. Finally, the lack of a proactive European or United States interest in Turkey (except when European or American interests are at stake) are added incentives for Turkey to turn its focus east, towards Central Asia.

Ultimately, Turkey views Central Asia as a pivotal region, where any expansion of an Iranian influence would have a negative affect on Turkey's long term interest. Turkey has been a strong advocate of a secular democratic government, even when the majority of the government is comprised of people who are Islamic. Converse to the Islamic fundamentalism that has dominated Iranian politics, Turkey has proven successful at balancing the religious and democratic principles in a non-disruptive manner. Turkish interests are to see an expansion of this secular governance into a region that has traditional ethnic ties to Turkey and offers great economic potential.

The Turkish example of government is a viable model for adoption in Central Asia, and if successfully implemented, could provide a stable base from which to further integrate Central Asian republics into the world community. Turkey's transition from a dictatorship to democracy and from a closed economy to an open, market economy parallels the challenges currently facing Central Asia.³³ From a U.S. perspective, one that seeks to bolster its relationship with Turkey while limiting Iranian opportunities for exporting its anti-Americanism, Turkish engagement in Central Asia may be valuable.

Oil/Gas Development: Engagement with Central Asia may be considered academic from a U.S. perspective, unless the true value of the region to U.S. interests is properly understood. One of the most significant interests to the U.S. is the abundant oil and gas reserves available for development and export from the Caspian Sea region. To a country that is highly dependent on maintaining a steady flow of oil and gas to fuel an expanding world economy, guaranteeing accessibility to the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea basin makes sense. The Caspian Sea is land-locked, with no direct access to blue water. It is the site of one of the world's richest known oil and gas reserves, bordered by five countries which are all desirous of exploration and development of these reserves. It is estimated that the Caspian Sea has potential reserves exceeding 200 billion barrels of oil, more than the total known reserves of both Iraq and Iran and nearly equal that of Saudi Arabia. As stated by John Lichtblau, Chairman, Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, "The Caspian region could become the most important new player in the world oil markets over the next decade."³⁴

The reserves in the Caspian Sea could be a significant off-set to the current oil control of the Middle East, providing an alternative source. Caspian Sea reserves will not dislodge the Middle East from its unique position as the world's prime oil exporter, but where oil prices are determined, the incremental supply from the new reserves in the Caspian will have a disproportionate positive impact on the world market.³⁵

Oil and gas production is rapidly being modernized in Central Asia, with the assistance of foreign investments. The most successful has been the Kazakhstan - Chevron Tengizchevroil (TCO) partnership for developing the Tengiz and Korolev oil fields in western Kazakhstan. In 1997, TCO produced 150,000 barrels per day. But the company has been hindered by the lack of an adequate pipeline for access to the international market. According to Chevron's Richard Matzke, without a new pipeline, exporting oil requires shipping the product via rail cars from Tengiz to Aqtau on the Caspian Sea. From there the oil is barged to Baku where it is transported by pipeline to Ali Bayramli in Azerbaijan for reloading into rail cars and on to the Georgian Black Sea port of Batumi. This is a time-consuming and expensive method of transportation, compounded by precarious tariff systems in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. In February 1999, Chevron temporarily stopped oil shipments along this route because of the high tariffs which had made Kazakhstan oil non-competitive in a world market of low oil prices. Therefore, the establishment of efficient pipelines to reduce the time and cost of transporting the oil is essential to successful exploitation of the regions oil reserves.

According to John H. Lichtblau, "The region needs multiple pipelines to carry the oil to seaports where it can be loaded into tankers."³⁶ Currently there are a number of pipeline proposals concerning the Caspian Sea, with routes across Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Turkey. The existing pipeline originates in Baku, Azerbaijan and extends through Chechnya to the Russian Black Sea port city of Novorossiysk. A second, competing pipeline is the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) proposal for a 920 km pipeline from Baku, on the western shore of the Caspian Sea, to the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa. This proposal uses both new and existing pipelines to establish a throughput system for the transfer of Caspian Sea oil to market. Construction has started on this pipeline.

An alternative plan is development of a 1,300 km southern pipeline route from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port city of Ceyhan. This alternative includes running the pipeline through or around Armenia, at a cost of more than \$2 billion.³⁷ There are also other plans for pipelines from the Caspian area, including plans for a potential pipeline through Iran. However, plans for any U.S. company involvement in a pipeline through Iran are impacted by the U.S. embargo of Iran, which precludes U.S. firms from trade with Iran. This, as well as other problems, caused BP-Dutch Shell on December 24, 1998 to postpone indefinitely any plans for development of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey via Iran in lieu of a proposed gas pipeline across the bottom of the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan.³⁸ However, recent events in Afghanistan offer the potential for development of an alternative pipeline from Turkmenistan, across Afghanistan, to Pakistan and the Indian Ocean port at Karachi, thus avoiding Iran altogether.

One of the routes that has received early approval and has foreign funding is being constructed by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to the Russian Black Sea port at Novorossiysk. This pipeline is 1,200 km in length, with an ultimate capacity of 1.5 million barrels of crude per day.³⁹ It will by-pass the volatile Caucasus Region and be used for the export of Caspian Sea oil and Tengiz oilfield products from Kazakhstan. On November 2, 1998, the Government of Kazakhstan approved the Caspian Pipeline Consortium Study for construction of the pipeline, and one month later the Russian Government approved the plan. With the assistance of the consortium Russian member, LUKoil, all four local Russian construction permits were also obtained in late 1998.⁴⁰ Construction of the pipeline is estimated at \$2.3 billion USD and, while originally intended for operation by the end of this year, is now expected to open in late 2002.

One of the most significant problems facing the Caspian Sea is the current demarcation dispute. In other words, who has control over what areas of the sea. In the past, Russia proposed that, since the Caspian Sea is a land-locked body of water not connected to any other ocean or sea, it is actually a lake. The Russians proposed that the sea be divided up by the five surrounding nations based upon the amount of shoreline. Others have argued, such as Kazakhstan, that it is a sea, which falls under the international maritime rules of national jurisdiction. This would allow for national

control within 200 miles of the shoreline, and leave the central part of the Caspian Sea open for any nation to use, without territorial control.

Recently, Russia and Kazakhstan reached agreement on the demarcation issue which establishes territorial boundaries of the northern portion of the sea. Azerbaijan and Russia have also issued a joint statement of tentative agreement on Caspian Sea issues.⁴¹ These are important steps in resolving one of the most significant impediments towards oil and gas exploration and development in the region. Unlike most other Caspian Sea littoral states, Iran has remained tied to earlier agreements signed between Iran and the USSR in 1921 and 1942. This will continue to hamper Iranian exploration of the Caspian Sea and provides further evidence of why Iranian engagement with Central Asian countries will continue to lack a clear focus and unified direction.

From a United States perspective, a country very dependent on a stable and continuous flow of the world's oil supply for itself and its allies, development and exportation of the oil reserves of the Caspian Sea region remain a priority for foreign policy determination and provides a significant reason for engagement in the region.

WMD/Nuclear Non-Proliferation:

The 1998 NSS is very comprehensive in articulating a U.S. determination to advance U.S. interests through arms control and nonproliferation initiatives. The only republic in Central Asia with nuclear weapons within the FSU was Kazakhstan. The 1998 U.S. Military Strategic Assessment stresses the fact that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and the United States have collaborated to make Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarussia free of nuclear weapons.⁴² In Central Asia, Kazakhstan has ratified the START II treaty and actively engaged in destroying weapons included under that treaty.

Concerning weapons of mass destruction, Central Asian republics have not engaged in the development or deployment of WMD, but with growing military interest, such as that being displayed by Uzbekistan, the United States may feel obligated to continue working towards WMD-free republics. One of the minor concerns is the potential for biological research that is not in compliance with the BWC. As stated in the 1998 Strategic Assessment "The challenge will be to

engage these and other countries in the region in efforts to correct and prevent future proliferation transgressions.”⁴³ To meet this objective requires active engagement along with the cooperation of the host nation, as seen from the negative impacts associated with a non-cooperative nation, such as Iraq. For the United States, shaping the environment towards nuclear and WMD non-proliferation can be far more productive in a cooperative engagement than through hostile coercion.

SHAPING CENTRAL ASIA BY ENGAGING KAZAKHSTAN

In the book Central Asia, Graham E. Fuller argues that Kazakhstan "is the most potentially volatile country in the region" and if it can be stabilized, it has the greatest capability of assisting Russia, as there are more Russians in Kazakhstan than in any other Central Asian republic.⁴⁴ In the past three years, the United States has greatly increased its interaction with the Republic of Kazakhstan. Until its recent elections, Kazakhstan was receiving some of the highest levels of U.S. foreign aid in Central Asia. This increased aid, military assistance, and diplomatic relations have proven beneficial in spurring the transformation of this former Soviet state towards global integration and have demonstrated a U.S. commitment to the republic's independence. But they have not been nearly sufficient enough to motivate Kazakhstan to meet the democratic objectives desired by U.S. policy makers and this lack of rapid democratization has recently caused a serious retrenchment by the United States.

The current NSS does not adequately recognize the strategic importance of Central Asia to stability in the Transcaspian region beyond the issues of oil and gas and WMD. With one of the world's largest oil reserves, located within a region which has the potential for activities that are counterproductive to United States national interests, this essay postulates that the United States should more aggressively engage the Republic of Kazakhstan through a focused policy supportive of Kazakhstan independence and regional leadership; advancing political, economic, and military relationships which enhance United States interests in the region; strengthen Kazakhstan's regional position as a secular, democratic republic; and assists Kazakhstan's transformation into a market economy.

If the United States is to be effective in achieving these objectives, it is reasonable to theorize that it should be accomplished in partnership with one of the region's dominant republics. But before analyzing a partnership policy with Kazakhstan, an understanding of the Republic is necessary because for a rational foreign policy program to be proposed, it must be tailored specifically towards the country for which it is intended to be applied.

History: History is an important ingredient in understanding relationships of people and actions by their country. A paper of this nature can not do justice to the extensive history of the people of Kazakhstan. But a limited review of critical events which have shaped the region over the past few hundred years is beneficial towards understanding how modern day politics influence current events. An historical review may prove valuable for understanding the type of foreign policy the U.S. may want to advance towards a newly independent nation which is half way around the world and, until 1991, had been correctly viewed by as part of the former Soviet Union.

The history of Kazakhstan, as we know it at the end of the twentieth century, is relatively new. But the history of the region is ancient. The first recorded encounters of civilization in the region now known as Kazakhstan occurred around 1,000 B.C..⁴⁵ The peoples of the steppe were nomadic, with little ties to formal states and territorial boundaries. Around 500 B.C. the region was inhabited by the Saka, also a nomadic tribe, with a limited organizational structure. For the next 1,000 years, the region remained inhabited but with virtually no recorded historical events. Around 550 A.D. Turkic peoples from China and Mongolia moved into the area and established cities along the southern edge of what is now Kazakhstan. Around this time, the region also became the central transport route for trade between Europe and Asia, called the "Silk Road". While most trade along the Silk Road traveled south of Kazakhstan, the northern route crossed the Tian Shan Mountain Range and traversed portions of southern Kazakhstan. Settlements and trading posts were located along this route, at places like Taraz, Kulan, Yassy, and Otrar.⁴⁶

In 1218, Jenghis Khan brought a large Mongol army through the area and established Central Asia as part of the Mongol Empire, an area later divided into separate regions following the death of Jenghis Kahn. This divided region included the area of western and northern Kazakhstan becoming part of the Golden Hord, with and the remaining bulk of Kazakhstan aligned with western Xinjiang, China. By the 15th century the Kazakhs had gained control of the land and the region had been further divided. This period was characterized as a cultural renaissance to the peoples of Central Asia, and much of today's legacy can be traced back to this period of development and organization.⁴⁷ It was in the later half of the 15th century that the nomadic peoples of the region

started to consolidate and by the mid 16th century a united nation of Kazakhs' had emerged, although the people of this new nation remained nomadic by nature.⁴⁸

In the late 17th century, the Jungars, directed by Chinese Bogdykhans, initiated a war with the Kazakh peoples, defeating the Kazakhs in 1723.⁴⁹ To ensure survival, the Kazakhs sought military help from Russia, which sent forces onto the steppe to prevent Kazakh annihilation, this being the first recorded event of Russian intervention in the region.⁵⁰ After being defeated by the Chinese, and being threatened by Mongolian expansionism, the Kazakhs accepted a new alliance with Russia. Russia took advantage of this opportunity to start expansion efforts from Siberia into the region. All three Kazakh khans established allegiance to the Russian crown by 1742.⁵¹ By 1750, Russian and Cossack settlers started migrating south into the Kazakh lands of what is now northern Kazakhstan. Russia, projecting forward presence into Kazakhstan, eventually abolished the Kazakh khanates. By 1854 the Russians had established a fort at the settlement of Verny, now called Almaty, in southern Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan ceased to exist as an independent nation in 1871, following defeat of the Khanates by the Russians at Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva.⁵² By now, the area of present day Kazakhstan had become part of the ultimate "Great Game" conflict between Russia and England that would continue until World War I.

From the Kazakhstan perspective, most of the "Great Game" was played to the west and south of present day Kazakhstan, with principle action occurring from the Caspian Sea, south of the Aral Sea, down into Afghanistan. Throughout this period, Kazakhstan remained firmly under the control of the Tsar and the Russian Empire. This historical perspective is important because it explains part of the reason why, even after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan remains closely tied to Russia in economic, political, and military affairs. That recognition is important for a United States understanding of how relationships with Kazakhstan are viewed in Astana and Moscow.

Present Day Kazakhstan: Present day Kazakhstan is bordered by Russia, China, the Caspian Sea, and Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan declared independence from Russia on December 16, 1991.⁵³ Kazakhstan is a secular republic which has maintained steadfast

opposition to religious governance, such as Islamic fundamentalism. As the largest republic in Central Asia, situated along a 5,000 km long border with Russia, Kazakhstan is ideally situated to become a regional leader. Kazakhstan has a population dominated by native ethnic Kazakh's, but with a substantial minority of Russians. A small minority of other ethnic groups are also scattered across the vast countryside.

Map of Kazakhstan - 1998



Republic of Kazakhstan

Government	Constitutional Republic (Secular)
Date of Independence	December 16, 1991
Capital City	Astana
Financial Center	Almaty
Total Area	104,300,000 square miles
Population (1998)	16.5 million (51% Kazakh, 32.4% Russian, 17% Others)
National Currency	Tenges
Inflation	1994 = 1258% 1995 = 160% 1996 = 22% 1997 = 12% est.
Foreign Trade	62% with CIS countries 23% with European countries 13% with Asian countries 2% with Others
Natural Resources	Oil and Gas, Coal Non-ferrous metals: zinc, lead, copper, alumina, titanium, bauxite, etc.
Main Industries	Oil and Gas, Petrochemicals, Textiles, Electrical equipment, Metallurgy
Main Agricultural Products	Grain, Wool, Meat

Following independence, Kazakhstan established official relationships with numerous countries and international organizations. While being one of the lead countries in the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Kazakhstan also submitted applications for membership in a variety of other established international organizations. Kazakhstan was accepted as a seated member of the United Nations during the 46th session of the UN General Assembly in March 1992.⁵⁴ The republic has also been active in establishing membership and agreements with numerous other international organizations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Asian Development Bank, the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development, the World Health Organization (WHO), the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to name just a few of the more significant ones.⁵⁵

Today, instead of Kazakhstan being just a way-station for dominating foreign powers, the republic is attempting to develop into a nation which can use its strategic advantages of location and natural resource wealth to influence others. But there are temptations by foreign nations (including the United States) to view Kazakhstan as a powerless state in a natural resources rich area; an area to be exploited. This paper will advance the proposition that a strong and stable Kazakhstan, more so than an exploited republic, can be of great value to the United States in stabilizing Russia, Central Asia, and the regions surrounding it, such as the Near East, China, and Southwest Asia.

Russian Relations: In conducting research for this essay, a consistent theme was heard that the United States must be cautious in developing relationships with Kazakhstan because it has a common border with Russia and has historically been considered within the Russian sphere of influence. The concern was that U.S. involvement this close to Russia would create further tensions between the U.S. and Russia. This argument has been used to justify why U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan must be limited. But to argue that approach assumes a Russian response to U.S. involvement must be counter to U.S. interests and reflects a U.S. predisposition that involvement in a region under the Russian sphere of influence must be counter to Russian interests.

From a Russian perspective, recent U.S. engagement policies provide numerous examples of U.S. actions that appear threatening to the Russians and have caused aggravation in foreign relations with the U.S.. These include NATO expansion closer to Russia; NATO military strikes in Serbia; U.S. unilateral strikes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Sudan in 1998; and others. But, if the United States wants Russia to be a stable power and supportive player in world events, than it is incumbent upon the United States to provide the forum for that development to occur.

This concern about a negative Russian response to U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan would be valid only if the U.S. - Russian relationship were still the same adversarial relationship experienced during the fifty years of the Cold War. But, it is reasonable to propose that with the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia need no longer be an enemy of the United States. Rather, Russia is an evolving market economy, albeit very slowly, and integration into the western economic and political community may eventually occur, which is in the best security interests of Europe and the United States. How Russia receives United States engagement with Kazakhstan will depend on how the United States implements its policies and programs with Kazakhstan. If the United States advances interests that are counter to Russian interests, the conclusion that Russia will react in a negative manner to U.S. engagement becomes plausible. However, if the United States advances a program that minimizes threats to Russia, and actually creates benefits that can be obtained by Russia, than engagement with Kazakhstan could become a key ingredient towards advancing Eurasian stability and a favorable world order. Engaging Kazakhstan does not need to be threatening to Russia.

This essay will consider that one of the primary benefits of engaging Kazakhstan is directly related to its relationship with Russia and how that variable may be beneficial to United States long term interests within the region. The argument that engagement of a republic adjacent to the Russian border and within its historical sphere of influence should not be pursued because of potential Russian reactions must be compared against other United States similar actions since the demise of the Soviet Union. In the Baltic Region, the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia occurred with both U.S. and European nations embracing the new republics independence and establishing diplomatic and economic relations. This resulted in the Baltic republics developing much closer ties

with Europe and being able to make the transition to market economies. Likewise, the reindpendence of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other countries within the former eastern Europe has shown that advancing democratic, market economics in previous communist controlled areas close to Russia can be implemented successfully, to the degree that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were voted into the NATO alliance in 1998.

In the Caucasus region, U.S. actions in Azerbaijan demonstrate how U.S. efforts at strengthening relations with a new republic that shares a common border with Russia can be accomplished without generating significant adverse counteractions by Russia. In Azerbaijan, the government has gone so far as to offer to the United States the opportunity to build a military base near Baku to protect the valuable oil resources of the Caspian Sea.⁵⁶ While Russia has not endorsed such a proposal (and the United States has not accepted Baku's offer) it has refrained from escalating the Azerbaijani proposal into a confrontation with the United States. This paper is not going to make an assessment on whether the US should commit to building a military facility in Azerbaijan, as that topic alone could be another research project. However, the public offer by Azerbaijan demonstrates that active U.S. engagement close to Russia can be accomplished without necessarily causing a hostile Russian counteraction. Simply put, how the United States engages Kazakhstan, and under what premise the United States views its evolving relationship with Russia, is the key ingredient as to whether U.S. interests can be expanded by developing a partnership with a Central Asian regional leader.

Today, Kazakhstan maintains close relations with Russia, supplying a significant amount of food stuffs to Russia, providing the location for the Russian space launch facility, maintaining close military cooperation, and being one of the founders of the CIS. Kazakhstan continues to look more towards Russia than towards the west for direction and solutions. As the Russian economy suffers, agricultural production is poor, and the price of oil is depressed, the ability of the republic to establish a stable economy suffers. Tying the Kazakhstan *tenge*s to the Russian *ruble* has, in effect, nullified many of the gains made by Kazakhstan. President Nazarbayev recognized this problem in his September 30, 1998 speech, where he commented that "devaluation of the ruble and other

changes in the Russian economy are having an adverse impact on many of our businesses.”⁵⁷ Despite this negative influence of the ruble, Kazakhstan, unlike Russia, has been able to bring currency inflation under control in the past five years, reducing it from over 2,000 percent to less than 10 percent. Kazakhstan has also demonstrated an understanding of market economics through development and export agreements with multinational oil and gas firms, as well as successfully negotiating a new Caspian Sea pipeline across Russia to ports in the Black Sea.

In the post-Soviet Union era, Kazakhstan has pronounced a determination towards succeeding in independence by building a nation, where no historical foundation previously existed. In less than five years they established a functional framework for national government that has aggressively tackled domestic problems of integration and stability, while out-reaching to the international community for involvement and interaction. Unlike some other newly independent states, Kazakhstan has not been engulfed in domestic civil war, ethnic violence, or political upheaval. This has been a tremendous benefit in allowing the nation to focus on nation-building and stabilization within the international community.

Militarily, Kazakhstan desired keeping a consolidated force with Russia and other Central Asian countries under the control of the CIS following the demise of the former Soviet Union. Only when Russia elected to establish its own separate security forces did Kazakhstan establish their own national defense force. In the early years of independence, Kazakhstan solicited an agreement with Russia, whereby Russian forces would provide the security for Kazakhstan. In 1992, Kazakhstan activated a Ministry of Defense and established a State Security Council to administer national security issues.⁵⁸ While initially Kazakhstan supported Russian border guards along its external borders, by 1995 Kazakhstan had established and deployed Kazakh border guards, reducing the Russian presence to only a small administrative role.⁵⁹ But Russia also still maintains nearly 20,000 troops within Kazakhstan, many assigned to the Space Forces working at the space training and space launch facilities at Baikonur Cosmodrome.

One the most difficult issues between Russia and Kazakhstan has been over the space missile launch facility at Baikonur. Negotiations were long, with a strong Kazakhstan position that the

facilities are not Russian, but Kazakhstans. Agreement on the facility was reached in 1998, with a multi-year lease of the facilities offered to Russia. This was a set-back for Russia, which ultimately acknowledged that the facility belonged to Kazakhstan, and no longer was Russian, a clear indication of Kazakhstans ability to negotiate as an independent nation.

Kazakhstan had been a leader in oil production during the Soviet Union era. Large oil refinery's were constructed with oil production primarily targeted for use in Russia and the republics which comprised the Soviet Union. With the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited these large, and technology deteriorating plants. In addition, since oil flowing from Kazakhstan primarily went north to serve the Soviets, oil export pipelines were only built to serve that limited market. Today Kazakhstan has embarked on an aggressive oil development and export program to generate both jobs and capital. One of the earliest investment projects undertaken by Kazakhstan was the partial privatization of the Tengiz oil-field in conjunction with Chevron-USA, which eventually also included the nearby Korolev oil field. In 1993, Chevron agreed to a 40 year, \$20 billion plan to develop the oilfield for production and export, forming a joint venture called Tengizchevroil (TCO) to accomplish the project. It was estimated that up to \$4.5 billion of high-quality oil could be sold each year from this site, with Kazakhstan retaining approximately 80 percent of the profit. But to make this project profitable, a new pipeline was required which could efficiently move that quantity of oil from production to the export market. Chevron owns 45% of TCO.⁶⁰

But some may argue that these attributes do not make Kazakhstan unique enough to support a regional leadership position in Central Asia. For example, Uzbekistan is also developing a relatively strong economy, has embraced secular governance, and is developing a strong military force structure independent of Russia. In order to advance a position that the U.S. should engage Kazakhstan, it is appropriate to consider the conditions of other republics in Central Asia.

Other Central Asian Republics: One of the limitations to U.S. foreign policies in Central Asia is the lack of clear and concise engagement policies for the separate republics. As is done in other regions of the world, it may be most appropriate for the U.S. to engage each of the Central

Asian republics with a tailored program which advances U.S. interests in relation to each individual republic.

Central Asia remains a weak region of marginal stability, as seen by the continuing violence in Tajikistan and the recent Tashkent bombing assassination attempt against President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.⁶¹ But, simply because the region is not stable, does not lessen the need for U.S. involvement. In fact, because of the relationship to U.S. interests, it may increase the need for U.S. involvement. Therefore, a proactive approach towards Central Asia could provide the United States with the most plausible scenario for shaping an environment which achieves U.S. objectives. This section will provide a short analysis of each of the four other Central Asia republics.

Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan has the greatest potential to rival Kazakhstan for regional leadership in Central Asia. The Uzbekistan government is a secular, constitutional republic, but has been documented by UN human rights monitors as one of the most repressive republics in Central Asia. The population base has far less of an ethnic split than in Kazakhstan with the predominate majority consisting of Uzbeks, which also make up a portion of the ethnic population in most other Central Asian republics. However, ethnic and radical religious factions have been active in Uzbekistan, with the potential for instability most recently demonstrated by the presidential assassination attempt on February 16, 1999 in Tashkent.

Uzbekistan has one of the strongest economies in Central Asia. It has control of some of the most fertile agricultural lands of Central Asia and has been developing its industrial base since collapse of the Soviet Union. Its oil reserves are small compared to the Caspian Sea reserves of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but the republic is a producer of natural gas, with the majority of gas fields located at the far eastern edge of the country bordering Kyrgystan. Uzbekistan has been aggressive in seeking foreign investments in diversifying their industrial and manufacturing base. On March 16, 1999 Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel attended the opening ceremonies of the joint-venture automotive plant Samkochaauto in Samarkand. Turkey's KocHolding company built the \$65 million plant and is co-owner.⁶² It is the second automotive

assembly plant to open in Uzbekistan. Daewoo of Korea recently entered into a joint venture for the production of cars and many other similar type industrial based joint ventures are being consummated in Tashkent. The UzDaewooAuto plant in Andijan began operating in 1996.⁶³

But this new found independence, coupled with the harsh autocratic control of the government has made Uzbekistan bellicose. While Uzbekistan was an original sponsor of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, it recently decided not to renew its membership. Uzbekistan has demonstrated independence from Russia by establishing the regions largest military, without Russian troops. The republic has modernized its defense forces and is actively considering joining with Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova in a collective agreement, which would challenge Russian influence. This can be viewed as a deliberate step to position Uzbekistan as the regional leader for Central Asia, at the expense of other developing republics, primarily Kazakhstan.

In addition, there remain other problems with the Central Asian republic that would detract from their ability to garner regional leadership in Central Asia. For example, Uzbekistan recently cut off gas supplies to the Republic of Kyrgystan due to the large debt for supplies, estimated in excess of \$3.0 million in February 1999.⁶⁴ This type of action could be considered a threat to Kazakhstan, as Uzbekistan maneuvers to gain regional influence counter to Russian interests. The country has little influence in the determination and resolution of gas and oil exploration, which diminishes their ability to influence geopolitical affairs in Central Asia. Because of that fact, and more significant to U.S. interests, it is possible to speculate that the immense wealth of Caspian Sea oil and gas to Kazakhstan may eventually create animosity between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where Uzbekistan may seek to gain a portion of the Caspian Sea wealth, either through gaining territory that provides Caspian Sea access or by forcing a sharing of the wealth through other means. This could create serious problems for U.S. access to the oil and gas rich Caspian Sea region

Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan is situated on the southern side of Central Asia, bordering Iran, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan has established a secular constitutional republic and taken a path of neutrality by not developing a strong military force, but also by not relying upon Russian troops. While its oil reserves are not significant, the republic has the largest gas

reserves in the region, projected at over 100 trillion, and has embarked on a diversified economic program for redevelopment of dysfunctional and dilapidated former Soviet Union industries.

Turkmenistan has a Iranian population base and has been actively negotiating with Iran for potential pipeline routes for the export of Caspian Sea oil and gas. Turkmenistan has already established direct rail service with Iran connecting Mashhad, Iran to Saragt, Turkmenistan. However, Turkmenistan recently signed an agreement to construct a \$2.5 billion US Dollars, 2,500 kilometers gas pipeline with U.S. firms that when finished in 2002, will carry up to 30 billions cubic meters of gas. The pipeline will bypass Iran, which resulted in a serious objection to the agreement by Iran, crossing the Caspian Sea and connecting to Azerbaijan at the port of Baku, continuing through Azerbaijan and Georgia on its way to Erzerum in Turkey. "Any action in the Caspian Sea without the agreement of all littoral states is invalid and legally unacceptable," stated Iranian Foreign Ministry senior spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi.⁶⁵ Further demonstrating the problems of relations with Iran, it was stated, "This unilateral move by Turkmenistan is deplorable and the Turkmen officials should know that Washington is in pursuit of its interests in the region as it has proved its ill-intentions after entering into agreements with the Azerbaijan republic. In other words the U.S. presence in Turkmenistan will not be to the benefit of that country in the long run. In short, the Turkmen officials should not celebrate the inking of the gas agreement as in reality Turkmenistan has not achieved anything positive but rather lost its credit among its neighbors." said an editorial in the paper that is published by the official news agency IRNA.⁶⁶ Turkmenistan also announced continuation of developing the Turkmenistan-Iran gas pipeline which will provide for the transfer of 30 billion cubic meters of gas once it is constructed.

Kyrgystan: Often identified as the Switzerland of Central Asia, more for its splendid mountains than for political neutrality or free market economics, Kyrgystan is the smallest of the five Central Asian republics, with one of the least quantities of natural resources for potential development. Kyrgyzstan was the first of the Central Asian Soviet-republics to declare independence from the USSR, and today it continues to lead in terms of political and economic

restructuring and reform. The Kyrgyz Republic has been one of the most open, progressive and democratic of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. The Republic's early leadership in reform merited a significant response from the US. But some ethnic tensions, focused mainly on language and land privatization policies, are emerging between the Russians and the Kyrgyz populations.

Despite its initial successes, Kyrgystan is now struggling to cope with severe economic problems which have left it as one of the poorest countries in the CIS. The economy of Kyrgyzstan has been adversely affected since the middle of 1998 largely due to the financial crisis in East Asia and Russia. The initial effect of the financial crisis was a flight of capital, as Russian investors largely withdrew their funds and investments from Kyrgyzstan. Russia is still Kyrgyzstan's largest trading partner (accounting for over 20% of its total trade in 1997) and since it also has close commercial ties with the rest of CIS (which accounts for another 40% of the republic's trade), the disruptive effect of the Russian crisis and massive devaluation on trade within the whole region (and on Kyrgyzstan in particular) has inevitably been immense. On July 17, 1998, the Kyrgyz Republic successfully concluded WTO accession negotiations, and was admitted to the World Trade Organization in mid-December 1998, thereby becoming the 133rd and the first CIS-member to join the WTO.⁶⁷

More than 90 percent of the country is mountainous, hampering agriculture and limiting the development of natural resources. The Republic's hydroelectric potential is stymied by the enormous cost of investment needed for development. But, due in part to its rich mountainous terrain, Kyrgystan has an abundant water supply, a commodity in high demand across Central Asia. Kyrgystan water is ideal for irrigating agricultural land, but the majority of the fertile lands in Central Asia are within the eastern boundary of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan are in conflict over the land ownership, further stimulated by Uzbekistan which cut off gas sales to Kyrgystan in February 1999 due to a lack of payment on previous sales. Kyrgystan does, however, produce nearly 35% more electricity than is needed within the republic, making this one of its most valuable exports.⁶⁸

Tajikistan: Although the most active period of conflict was in 1992, the republic continues to be rift with civil war, divided between ethnic and religious factions that seek to control the national government. President Emomali Rakmanov came to power by ousting a coalition of Islamists and democrats in 1992 and has presided over the civil war torn republic since then. He narrowly survived an assassination attempt in April 1997. Islamic fundamentalism sponsored by Afghanistan remains a strong opposition force in the southern half of the republic. Troops from the CIS, including Russian troops of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, remain engaged in peacekeeping activities in Tajikistan. Terror continues to fester in Tajikistan, demonstrated by the murder of four personnel assigned to the United National Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) on July 20, 1998.⁶⁹

The country is bordered by Afghanistan, another unstable state. Tajikistan does not border the Caspian Sea, and is a great distance from the oil and gas reserves of western Central Asia. The country is the poorest of the Central Asian republics and has failed to develop a market economy which can produce any measure of wealth for the republic. In contrast to many other Central Asian republics, the economy continues to decline, with as much as one third of the population unemployed. Compounding the civil war problems, the border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has continued to be closed. While recent progress has been seen in stabilizing Tajikistan, by the appointment of members of the United Tajik Opposition party to key government posts, the root of instability in the republic has not been solved and Tajikistan remains a very unstable country, completely unprepared to demonstrate any regional leadership capabilities itself. To put in bluntly, Tajikistan remains a political basketcase with no reasonable capability of exerting regional leadership or fostering regional stability.

And to compound Tajikistan's problems, the country remains a center for large scale drug-trafficking, with much of the illegal drugs destined for Central Asian republics. This has continued to create strains between Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics.

CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS STATISICAL COMPARISON CHART

	Kazakhstan	Kyrgystan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan
Area	2.7 mil. sq km	198,000 sq km	143,000 sq km	488,000 sq km	447,000 sq km
Population	16.5 million	4.7 million	6.1 million	4.7 million	24.1 million
Per Capita Income	\$2,880	\$2,750	\$920	\$2,840	\$2,430
Ethnic Groups	51% Kazakh 32% Russian 2% Uzbek	57% Kyrgyz 21% Russian 13% Uzbek	65% Tajik 23% Uzbek 4% Russian	70% Turkmen 15% Uzbek 5% Russian	70% Uzbek 8% Russian 4% Kazakh
Government	Secular Constitutional Republic	Parliamentary Republic	Parliamentary Republic	Parliamentary Republic	Secular Democratic Republic
Member of CIS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Member of CIS Collective Security Treaty	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Caspian Sea Access	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Oil Reserves	5.4 billion	40 million	12 million	546 million	594 million
Gas Reserves	65 trillion	0.2 trillion	0.2 trillion	66 trillion	101 trillion

United States Relations:

With the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the control of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction located both inside and outside of Russia was of initial concern for United States foreign policy makers. Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian republic among the new independent republics (Ukraine and Belarussia being the other former Soviet Union republics) that had nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan, eager to neutralize the nuclear weapons issue, ratified the START II treaty in July 1992, followed by ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and establishment as a non nuclear state in December 1993.⁷⁰

In return for their early endorsement of the non-proliferation process, the United States recognized Kazakhstan with "Most Favored Nation" trading status in 1992 and subsequently increased foreign support. In 1994, the United States took another step towards developing a partnership with Kazakhstan by significantly increasing United States assistance by almost four times the previous annual level of \$91 million.⁷¹ The United States also offered an additional \$85 million for the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapon systems in Kazakhstan. But by 1995 the United States National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement still concentrated almost exclusively on the non-proliferation issue, addressing no other significant reasons why Kazakhstan had any strategic importance to the United States.

It was not until 1997 that an integrated understanding of the importance of Central Asian activities gained the attention of Washington and under the new National Security Strategy for a New Century, U.S. strategy more clearly recognized that a stable and prosperous Caucasus and Central Asia will help promote stability and security from the Mediterranean to China and facilitate rapid development and transport of international markets for the large Caspian Sea oil and gas resources.⁷²

In order to build security trust between Kazakhstan and western powers at a time when Kazakhstan was disarming nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, the United States signed the Memorandum of Security Decrees in Budapest in December 1994.⁷³ This agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia with Kazakhstan confirmed the signatories commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of Kazakhstan and to avoid the threat of, or use of, force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Kazakhstan. If Kazakhstan becomes a victim of aggression or an object of the threat of nuclear weapons, Russia, the United States, and Great Britain must demand immediate action by the U.N. Security Council to render assistance to Kazakhstan as a non-nuclear NPT member state.⁷⁴ This is a noteworthy agreement, as it ties both Great Britain and the United States into a quasi-mutual defense pact with Russia for the protection of Kazakhstan. By virtue of this agreement, the administration increased military assistance programs with Kazakhstan. This commitment has been further extended in the

"Joint Statement of Future U.S. Kazakhstan Defense and Military Relations" protocol, signed February 26, 1996. The United States has also been active in military to military support, including the contribution of six Coast Guard cutters to the Kazakhstan portion of the Caspian Sea Flotilla, which is comprised of Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan forces.⁷⁵

The United States is demonstrating a legitimate interest in engagement with the Republic of Kazakhstan. Actions taken over the past seven years indicate an understanding that Kazakhstan is an important country in regards to nuclear weapons non-proliferation, and that Kazakhstan is a willing partner in reducing the spread of nuclear weapons by signing the START II treaty and working with Washington to dismantle the weapons under Kazakhstan control. By joining the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1992, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995, and becoming a leader in the Central Asia Battalion, Kazakhstan has demonstrated a willingness to participate in international security matters that go beyond its borders.

The United States has also offered to provide military support to the degree that Kazakhstan is willing to accept such aid. Likewise, United States investors, especially the oil and gas industry, have demonstrated a commitment to Kazakhstan engagement, if but at a limited degree to date. So the questions remain as to how much United States support should be extended to Kazakhstan, what is the expected return for United States investments, and why should the United States place any greater emphasis on Kazakhstan development than on any other developing nation.

The United States maintains that the implementation of democratic governance is a primary threshold criteria for the development of closer relations with Kazakhstan. The 1999 presidential elections in Kazakhstan were criticized by the Organization of Security and Cooperation for Europe (OSCE) as failing to permit the openness necessary to constitute a democratic process. The U.S. contends that is partly why the U.S. has recently restrained diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan. While not fully meeting the international standards for democratic governance may be a worthy reason for diplomatically pressuring Kazakhstan to improve its openness and the establishment of rule of law, the U.S. response to the Kazakhstani elections may be counterproductive in assisting the republic to become a stronger democratic state with greater reliance on market economics. In the

long run, the current U.S. approach may have negative unintended consequences for the United States.

Within Eurasia, Russia remains the dominate security interest for the United States. But with U.S.-Russian relations deteriorating, the United States needs to develop a clear foreign policy direction towards Central Asia, which does not create the perception of aggression in Russia's "near abroad." The U.S. objective of engagement with Kazakhstan must go beyond existing programs to those which achieve regional stability in Central Asia and concurrently provide a means for the economic and political stabilization of Russia.

Potential Risks: One of the most predominate situations in Kazakhstan concerns the institutional stability of a republic divided between ethnic Kazakhs and Russians. In Kazakhstan, while the population is split between Russian (32%) and Kazakhs (51%), the majority of Russians live in the northern section of the country, which borders Russia, while the majority of Kazakhs live in the south. Russia remains concerned that Kazakhstan maintain internal stability between the Russian and Kazakh citizens. This could become a problem if the Russian minority were to decide to annex with Russia. However, the recent relocation of the capital from Almaty to Astana, as well as other initiatives for developing northern Kazakhstan, are designed to reduce the risk of Russians in northern Kazakhstan from initiating actions to be more closely aligned with Russia. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, many Russians that left Kazakhstan for Russia have started returning to Kazakhstan, where jobs are more plentiful and the currency more stable. In the long term, integration of Russian and Kazakh peoples in Kazakhstan may add to the strength and potential stabilization of the republic.

While Kazakhstan has not been aggressively interested in establishing their own military forces, rather hoping to maintain security defense through agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan has found that in order to satisfy their national security a Kazakhstani military defense force was necessary. But development of an independent force has not developed quickly, with a continued reliance on Russian security forces. Kazakhstan is a charter member of the CIS and maintains

participation in the CIS Collective Security Agreement and the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) organization, which demonstrates the republics intention of becoming more engaged militarily.

Kazakhstan faces a number of threats to success. First, the desire of Russia to retain dominance in the region, based as much on historical relationships as on the fact that Kazakhstan shares a 5,000 km border with Russia, means Russia continues to have close relations with Kazakhstan and strives to retain leverage in the international relationships developed by Kazakhstan. Second, being so closely tied to Russia, the economy of Kazakhstan has had a difficult time stabilizing on the international market. While Kazakhstan has been much more aggressive than Russia in controlling inflation and strengthening the national currency, the *tenges* is not exchangeable on the international market. Third, China also shares a long common border with Kazakhstan. Chinese expansionism could have a significant impact on Kazakhstan independence. This is sufficient enough concern to Kazakhstan that they have deployed their air forces along the Chinese border to provide air defense against any potential Chinese hostile action. Forth, while Kazakhstan is a declared secular state, Islamic pressures from the region could be a factor in the ability of the government to maintain stability. Fifth, the government, while a declared republic, does not practice full democratic principles, as noted by the recent United States and OSCE condemnation of President Nazarbayev's actions against opponents in the recent elections. President Nazarbayev maintains very tight and strict control of the government. Sixth, Iranian interests include the expansion of Islamic governance and a focus towards Central Asia, while maintaining a distinctly anti-American attitude. Seventh, Kazakhstan rejection of U.S. initiatives based on fear of neo-imperialism and/or a Kazakhstan perception that the United States is attempting to divide the world into blocks and alliances, which has been a position rejected by President Nazarbayev.⁷⁶ Eighth internal ethnic conflict which could result in a civil war between the Russian ethnic north and the Kazakh ethnic south.

Assessment: A prevailing position within the U.S. government is that U.S. engagement in Central Asia is virtually irrelevant. This argument appears based upon a perception that the region is economically poor, has too many conflicting interests, is too far away from the United States to

matter, and has not demonstrated an ability to really break away from Russia, or implement true democratic principles. A counterargument would be that a favorable world order, expanding democracies, and an enlarging economic marketplace is in the best interest of U.S. long term objectives, therefore early engagement with Central Asia improves the opportunity for these changes to occur favorable to U.S. interests.

There persist a number of tangible reasons why the U.S. should be engaged in Central Asia and why it appears relevant that increased engagement with Kazakhstan could be important to ultimate United States interest. The international geopolitics of the region are dynamic. Besides the obvious U.S. interest in oil development and exportation, and the clear desire to minimize the spread of WMD and nuclear weapons; Central Asia has become of interest to many of its neighbors. China has increased trade with Central Asia. Turkey has increased investment activities in Central Asia, in direct competition with Iran. Iran has engaged Central Asia economically in an effort to gain international acceptance and thwart U.S. containment policies. This potential for friction between Turkey and Iran over not just the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea, but also over the economic partnership with Central Asian republics could have significant long term consequences for the U.S if left unchecked. Russia remains the primary trading partner with Central Asia and continues to station military forces in Central Asia, albeit with the permission and approval of the respective Central Asian republics. From a geopolitical perspective, Central Asia remains a fault line between the Islamic world (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan) and the secular world (Russia, Turkey, China) with pressures on both sides to dominate the politics of the region. How the relationships between these two ideological views of the world materialize, will have a critical influence on how Central Asia develops with long term implications for the United States.

This essay is being written at a time when the U.S. is engaged in military action in the Balkans, through peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and NATO peacemaking in Serbia. As advocated by the Clinton Administration, U.S. engagement in the Balkans is essential to provide regional stability. This same position is articulated in the 1998 NSS which states that the U.S. has "vital security interests in the evolution of Russia, Ukraine, and the other NIS into democratic

market economies, peacefully and prosperously integrated into the world community.”⁷⁷ Based on the natural resource reserves of Central Asia, Central Asia’s ties with Russia, the geopolitical division between Islamic and secular interests in control of the governments of Central Asia, and a determination for a favorable world order by the United States, engagement with Central Asia seems necessary to achieve U.S. interests world-wide.

To advocate that the United States not be actively involved in Central Asia risks U.S. interests. Simply doing nothing does not ensure that national interests will be sustained in a region where a variety of dynamic interests are being interplayed by a variety of nations. Without U.S. engagement, there runs the risk that Turkey and Iran, both seeking to develop regional dominance in Central Asia may escalate pursuing their own interests across the region and come into direct conflict. Under this scenario, if Turkey is successful in unilaterally developing the economic and political ties necessary to become a significant influence in the development of Central Asia, than the U.S. may face problems in NATO and Europe, as Turkey starts to independently consolidate their Central Asian interests. This unilateral action could threaten Greece, Russia, and countries of the Middle East which currently have good relations with the United States. Increased unilateral regional power by Turkey could also result in a destabilization of the region, as countries which do not support Turkish hegemony develop alternative strategies to counter the Turkish influence. Turkey is an ally of the United States. Actions of opponent groups to Turkish interest in Central Asia may also result in negative implications to U.S. foreign policy in all of Central Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Greater Middle East. Without U.S. involvement with Turkey, the ramifications of this policy implementation could be damaging to U.S. interest worldwide.

Conversely, if Iran is successful in becoming economically integrated in Central Asia, then the U.S. policy of containment would be significantly damaged, as Iran would gain flexibility by having both an economic and political influence in the world through Central Asia. This has the potential to destabilize Central Asia relationships with Russia, which fears encroachment of Iranian Islamic Fundamentalism closer to its borders, as well as further threatening Russian security by losing influence in a bordering region to a non-secular political movement. Mark Roberts states that “The

demise of the Soviet empire enabled Iran to establish relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The Iranian desire to play the dominant role in Central Asia clashes with Turkish intentions."⁷⁸

Another potential adverse affect of U.S. neglect of Central Asia is a growing division between the Central Asian republics themselves, resulting an in an expansion of the turmoil currently being experienced in Tajikistan or creating new conflicts, as being seen by the recent actions in Uzbekistan to assassinate their president. Whether it is because of ethnic differences, economic differences, or simple political interest of regional hegemony, left unchecked and without the guiding influence of a strong external power, Central Asian politics could take the same turn as is currently being experienced in the Balkans. The ethnic differences and differences in economic wealth between the several republics has the potential for destabilizing both internal and external Central Asian politics. For that reason alone, it is important that United States policies recognize and address the potential regional dominance of Uzbekistan, which by U.S. standards of implementing a democratic process and advancing humans rights under a rule of law principle, is one of the worst in Central Asia.

In Central Asia, ethnic differences, religious differences, economic differences and the vacuum in external leadership once provided by a powerful Soviet Union provides a fertile ground for the possibility of conflict. As an example, Uzbekistan is currently positioning itself to be the dominant Central Asian military power, replacing the Soviet forces and attempting to become the regional hegemon. Uzbekistan has developed a relatively modern and efficient military defense force and no longer has Russian troops within its borders. On the reverse side, Turkmenistan has downsized their military forces and declared military neutrality towards military actions. Kazakhstan, while developing a national, military establishment for security, remains tied to the Russian military, with over 20,000 troops still in Kazakhstan. And Tajikistan is a basket case, divided by civil war with no legitimate government to organize security, requiring forces from the CIS, including Russian troops, to provide security and stem the violence. The potential for conflict between Uzbekistans interest in gaining military strength in Central Asia, and Kazakhstan's interest in remaining tied to

Russia with a much smaller and more internally directed security force could also be counterproductive to U.S. interest in developing democratic market economies and maintaining regional stability.

Lack of engagement in Central Asia by the U.S. could also result in the same foreign policy impotence that currently exists between the United States and most African nations. With the end of European colonization in Africa, the transformation to democratic market economies has been riddled with difficulty and false starts. Thirty years after independence, many Central African nations still have developed weak democratic institutions, or none at all, and many have been unable to develop strong economies for national growth and prosperity. Therefore, many African nations remain underdeveloped, impoverished countries with limited democratic freedoms. This is not the objective that the United States has established for Central Asia, as Central Asia is strategically located between the Middle East, Asia, and Russia and is rich in natural resources desired by the industrialized nations of the world. Therefore, there remain strong arguments for early engagement by the United States in Central Asian development to avoid an "African continent-like" end state.

To provide another example of the need to engage Central Asia, look just south to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. The region south of Central Asia is presently a tinderbox. From the unpredictable actions of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and his potential for development of WMD, to the radical actions of the fundamentalist governments of Iran and Afghanistan against U.S. interests, to the recent acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, the southern edge of Central Asia provides a very volatile area for conflict and actions adverse to U.S. interests. Some have argued that the potential of this instability and radical fundamentalism from expanding north into Central Asia is low, however, the reality is that the civil war in Tajikistan is being fueled by these exact interests which are not favorable to U.S. interest, and that the expansion of this violence and destabilizing actions have recently been seen in Uzbekistan.

So, because of the leadership vacuum created by the demise of the former Soviet Union, coupled with competition for the tremendous natural resource reserves, especially in oil and gas, Central Asia remains a volatile region in need of international relations. This is an ideal time for the

United States to be engaged to prevent instability and to assist in developing the republics in a manner favorable to U.S. interests and a favorable world order. As stated by John Doyle, DIA Officer for Russia and Eurasia during a presentation at the Naval War College, April 7, 1999, Central Asia is comprised of republics governed by personalities rather than by established institutions.⁷⁹ Unlike the United States, where changes in leadership can occur with very little change in the government, Central Asian governments are highly tied to the personality of the leadership. Changes in leadership can result in significant changes in policies, allies, and interests.

Central Asia has many of the same complexities and conflicting interest that are found in the Middle East. These include a number of individual countries where the majority of the population base is Muslim, but is not dominated by Islamic fundamentalism; conflicting interest between states interests, a region rich in oil resources, a region where Soviet influence had been significant in the past and where countries successfully moved away from the Soviet Union towards democracy and market-economies. The United States focus on the Middle East has been molded over the past four decades and has proven to be effective in achieving relative peace and stability by balancing numerous conflicting interest, such as preservation of the state of Israel while also working towards a peaceful solution to the Palestinian state problem, along with unifying most Arab countries against the rogue state actions of Iraq, to supporting Egypt's rise to regional leadership status following the expulsion of the Soviet Union, to active engagement with Lebanon to restore civil government and stability following the recent civil war.

There are parallels between Central Asia and the Middle East worthy of consideration in this assessment. The economic wealth of the regions, the religious and ethnic differences within each region, the external interest by neighboring countries in the development (both political and economic), and the fact that there exists interests counter to U.S. interest involved in the region illustrate these similarities. This is not to suggest that there exists any similar parallel to the unique relationship between the United States and Israel in Central Asia, but besides that anomaly, the regional interests are the same: stability and oil.

Leon Hadar observed that United States policy in the Middle East has been to "remain the predominant outside power and preserve United States and Western access to the region's oil."⁸⁰ He further states that United States interests seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect United States nationals and property and safeguard our access to international airways and seaways. Today in Central Asia, the discussion of Caspian Sea oil and gas development is gaining importance and United States involvement in the development of this industry is growing. Using the basis of foreign policy decisions for the Middle East can be useful towards justifying increased involvement in Central Asia. This is a geoeconomics approach, which parallels Middle East interest with Central Asian interest.

While some could argue that Central Asia does not have the same level of resource potential as does the Middle East, and a big drawback for Central Asia is the lack of blue water access, which means that oil exports must be routed through other countries, there does not exist the same level of religious division in Central Asia as historically has existed between the Arab nations and Israel and specifically the uniqueness of the Palestinian problem. However, these difficulties in the Middle East give justification to the need to find an alternative region for oil and that Central Asia, while lacking some of the Middle East problems could be a more stable source in the future, provided it is able to develop democratic market economies that are favorable to U.S. interests. Now is the time to establish that relationship before another nation with adverse interest to the U.S. becomes the regional hegemon.

In many ways, Central Asia mirrors the challenges faced by the United States in crafting a foreign policy which expands U.S. interests in a region which has not historically been a stable place for western interest. That is not to say that the Middle East is today a region of peaceful coexistence and stability, but rather that the United States policies, while punctuated with miscalculations and implementation mistakes, has been successful in advancing peace and stability and building a region which is far more secure at the end of the twentieth century than any time in the fifty years. One could argue that this model of foreign engagement is a good example to be followed in Central Asia.

The Middle East is clearly identified in the NSS. It clearly defied opposing relationships, such as between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. It recognizes the major U.S. interests and stability and world access to the oil reserves. It has similarities to Central Asia in controlling WMD, civil strife, national instability, and has the same neighbors as Central Asia (Turkey and Iran), both of which are of significant interest to the United States. It is this example that most clearly illustrates the potential opportunity for U.S. success in dealing with Central Asia and which provides an argument that engagement with Central Asia is not only necessary, but can be very beneficial to the United States ultimate objectives of shaping a favorable world order which promotes democracy abroad and bolsters America economic prosperity. If these can be accomplished, engagement with Central Asia will enhance U.S. security.

Summary: If the 1998 NSS is to be effectively implemented in Central Asia, than foreign policy changes must be made that avoid the conditions which foster the type of reactions currently being experienced in the Balkans. This would indicate that the U.S. may have to become more actively engaged in Central Asia early on to shape the stability of the region and to guide it in the economic development so necessary to maintaining security.

The first part of this essay has provided background information on Kazakhstan, its neighbors and its current international relations, while building an argument that the United States should become more engaged in Central Asia and develop an individual policy tailored towards U.S. interests with Kazakhstan. It has also argued that in developing a more aggressive foreign policy in Central Asia, the United States should seek to enhance the Republic of Kazakhstan as a regional leader which can provide a stabilizing force within the region, but can also bolster the activities of a U.S. ally like Turkey in solidifying a strong base from which secular, democratic, market-economy based, republics can emerge.

The second main objective of this essay is to identify the most favorable strategy for implementing U.S. foreign policies with Kazakhstan. This becomes the analytical portion of the report, attempting to illustrate that engagement with Kazakhstan has the potential for achieving U.S. interests while not creating greater negative unintended consequences that ultimately are not in the

United States best interest in the world. To accomplish that task, the remainder of this essay will evaluate the three pillars (instruments) of foreign engagement and provide a comparison with past U.S. actions to ascertain which instrument of foreign policy has the greatest potential for success.

WHICH POLICY: DIPLOMACY, ECONOMIC, OR MILITARY

The interaction of states is a complex process. With such a large number of countries in the world, all holding individual national goals, motivated by many different, and sometimes opposing objectives, maintaining security and world stability is a difficult proposition. In a well choreographed world, the many actions of individual states could be executed without coming into conflict. But that is an idealistic view of a world that, in actuality, has nations with conflicting interests. Therefore, for the United States to achieve their national security interests in this often dangerous and unstable global community, requires that the U.S. utilize a diversified approach towards foreign policy execution.

In his 1958 article "The Structure of Power in the American Society," C. Wright Mills argues that power in the United States is monopolized by three elites - military, economic, and political.⁸¹ His assessment of the power structure can be translated into the three contemporary instruments of foreign policy:

- Diplomatic
- Economic
- Military

Mills argues that each of these three means for employing a foreign policy have become increasingly interlocked and that they now can be considered but one "power elite."⁸² Nearly thirty years after Mills wrote this article, the three pillars of foreign affairs are being blended together in the NSS. For example, the use of military forces in such locations as Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti had less to do with clear military objectives than with political intentions. Diplomatic direction in achieving a variety of non-traditional military goals, such as feeding the hungry, reestablishing civil order and government, and ending human rights abuses has often times obfuscated the military role in foreign engagements. Likewise, much of the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. in expanding democracy and market economies has a direct relation to the economic aspects of U.S. foreign business investments and an expanding U.S. economy. Therefore, this essay will analyze the blending of the three pillars of foreign policy as a basis for evaluating which pillar, or combination of pillars, has the greatest

potential for advancing U.S. interests in Central Asia and in developing alternative approaches towards engaging the Republic of Kazakhstan.

To accomplish this analysis, a review of past uses of these means of engagement is worthwhile, to determine which have demonstrated a more probable expectation for success. This essay will look at a few historical examples of U.S. engagement to identify those that were successful and those that were not.

Diplomacy: Simply stated, diplomatic engagement is the process by which a nation enters into government to government discussions to advance their own foreign policy agenda. This may take many forms, but is most recognizable in the interactions between government heads-of-state. The opening of an embassy, followed by a series of agreements, treaties, and protocols between the two countries outlining goals and objectives and providing a framework from which both countries can understand their relationship with each other is part of a diplomatic engagement. Hans Morgenthau in his article The Future of Diplomacy says "If nations who are sovereign, who are supreme within their territories, with no superior above them, want to preserve peace and order in their relations, they must try to persuade, negotiate, and exert pressure upon each other. That is to say, they must engage in, cultivate, and rely upon diplomatic procedures."⁸³

The 1998 U.S. NSS identified diplomacy as a vital tool for countering threats to our national security.⁸⁴ But diplomacy is a broad term that actually needs to be divided into two separate and distinct uses to be effectively evaluated. The first is diplomacy between two or more adversarial states for the purpose of persuading, pressuring, or coercing the other to conform to their desires. A good example of this type of diplomacy would be the recent interactions between the United States, European states, and Yugoslavia. Diplomacy, in this instance, was conducted in an attempt to resolve the problem of Serbian human rights abuses against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Through a series of negotiations, an attempt was made to reach a peaceful agreement between the Serbian led Yugoslavian government and the Kosovo Liberation Army without using military force or economic measures. However, in this case, diplomacy was not sufficient to resolve all issues, resulting in the initiation of NATO military action against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999. This action illustrates

how military force can be an extension of diplomatic efforts, or as Clausewitz observed, "War is an extension of politics."⁸⁵

While diplomacy can be an effective tool between adversarial states, it often is only marginally effective. But when used between states that have friendly relations, or at least cordial relations without a high propensity towards confrontation, it can be a very effective tool. Diplomacy, under these conditions is the primary means used to obtain treaties, agreements, and for establishing relationships which meet the mutual benefits of both sides. A good example of this is the relationship between the United States and Canada. While there have been disagreements over numerous issues involving trade, fishing rights, treaty interpretations, laws, etc., there is no realistic threat of military action against either side. Here diplomacy is the primary means for achieving national interests for both countries.

Economics: Economic strategy is the second instrument of foreign policy engagement. It involves the use of economic factors, such as commerce, trade, and foreign assistance programs directed towards a desired end-state which is favorable to the nations security interests. Economic programs can take a variety of different forms, from membership in international financial organizations, like the World Trade Organization; to bi-lateral agreements between nations; tariff programs, like the European Common Market; financial aid programs designed to strengthen a relationship and/or persuade a nation to change policies more favorable to one's own interests; or punitive economic sanctions and/or embargo programs targeted against a nation in order to persuade that nation to change certain policies and practices.

The use of economics by the U.S. government as a tool of foreign relations has been declining over the past decade. In 1970-71, the United States provided 40 percent of the world's development assistance funding, but by 1993 U.S. investments had declined to less than 16 percent, with private investment funds to developing nations nearly three times the level of official aid.⁸⁶ This reduced effort is a significant problem for the United States, which has placed a high value on democratic, market-economy changes for developing nations world-wide.

Good examples of economic programs that seek to provide U.S. firms with opportunities for development and investment in developing countries are the USAID and TDA programs. Under these programs, U.S. companies have an ability to competitively bid on projects that traditionally may have excluded U.S. involvement. In accomplishing this, the U.S. is providing assistance funding to a developing nation, but also ensuring that U.S. companies benefit by participating in the development of the projects for which U.S. monies are targeted. However, USAID is actively reducing its operations, with nearly a 30% decrease in staff since 1995.⁸⁷ A far more common use of economic foreign policy is assistance programs which provide direct grants, or credits, to countries, such as humanitarian grants, military assistance programs, etc. But many of these programs have also been reduced over the past decade.

Military: Use of the military is the third instrument available to a nation in pursuit of influencing the foreign affairs of another country. While traditionally use of the military has meant the application of force against another nations military, it can also be used in a variety of less violent means; such as in providing military support, training, and counseling to developing nations; through arms sales and the weaponization of a country; and through treaties, agreements, and protocols which establish multi-national organizations and defense forces, such as NATO. Mackubin Owens describes military strategy clearly in his article An Overview of U.S. Military Strategy: Concepts and History, where he defines it as "concerned with the employment of military power in peace and war."⁸⁸ The 1998 U.S. NSS includes the use of military force as one of the primary methods available for shaping the international environment, but it also includes "maintaining a credible military force, with the demonstrated will to use it as essential in defending our national interests as a part of diplomacy, creating the framework for a more combined approach to foreign affairs."⁸⁹

U.S. Engagement Strategy Matrix Analysis

This portion of the essay will analyze these three instruments of foreign policy to ascertain which could be the most effective means for engaging Kazakhstan and shaping its development in a manner favorable to United States interests. To accomplish that objective, a strategy analysis matrix was developed comparing the relative success of each of the three instruments of foreign affairs in

other historical events. This matrix will be used to ascertain which instrument of foreign engagement, or combination of instruments, has been most successful towards achieving U.S. interests in a situation similar to that faced today with the developing relationship with Kazakhstan.

U.S ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY MATRIX

	Successful	Not Successful
Diplomacy	None	Appeasement (Pre-WW II)
Economics	None	US - Cuban Embargo US - Yugoslavia Oil Embargo Attempt (1999)
Military	Six Day War Jenghis Khan Gulf War	Iraq (Pre Gulf War) Britain - Central Asian Great Game
Diplomacy (Economics)	US - Canada US - Mexico US - England	US - Japan (Pre-WW II) European Powers (Pre-WW I)
Diplomacy (Military)	Camp David Accords Wye River Accords Egypt Break From USSR	US - Lebanon (1982)
Economic (Diplomacy)	US - China Post WW II Japan US - Thailand	US - Russia (Post Cold War)
Economic (Military)	US - Israel US - Turkey US - Pakistan US - Taiwan	US Containment of Iran
Military (Diplomacy)	US - Iraq (Gulf War)	US - Somalia
Military (Economic)	US - Turkey	US - Iran (Pre-1979)

Using the *U.S. Engagement Strategy Matrix*, it is possible to analyze the relative success/failure potential for each of the three instruments of foreign policy, both alone and in combination with each other. The first, and most significant aspect of the matrix indicates that there

appear to be few good examples of successful engagement using only one means. However, there are examples of failures when only a single means of engagement was used. In reality, it can be seen that most successful international relationships are typically conducted using a primary means, with active involvement of at least one other means.

Diplomacy: It is difficult to find an example of nations which resolved disagreements and shaped relationships based solely on diplomacy. That may occur because, in order for one nation to affect its interests on another nation, it must have some capability to exert some level of influence over the other nation. That influence may be in the means of military strength, economic influence, or some other interest, such as cultural or religious beliefs. In virtually every diplomatic relationship, there is a secondary interest.

There do exist examples of diplomatic actions between adversarial states that eventually resulted in the use of military force to compel acceptance of a diplomatic objective. A good example of this occurred at the start of World War II, where England and Germany negotiated agreements intended by the British to prevent war. In the late 1930's Adolf Hitler hoped to gain control of surrounding territories by using diplomatic threats and bluster, rather than war, to pressure Europe to concede to his demands. The unopposed re-occupation of the Rhineland, annexation of Austria, conquest of Czechoslovakia seemed to validate this approach. Appeasement resulted in a negotiated agreement in Munich to the annexation by Germany of all regions of Czechoslovakia.⁹⁰ Hitler was repeatedly successful in using diplomatic actions to avoid direct confrontation with England, while concurrently gaining agreements with Japan (the Anti-Comintern Pact), the Rome Berlin Axis Pact, and an alliance with Russia. These diplomatic efforts allowed Germany to advance their goals without having to use military power as the primary instrument of foreign affairs. However, as validated by Hitler's continued aggressive behavior and the blitzkrieg invasion of Poland, Denmark, and Norway, the threat of military power was the secondary interest (and eventually primary interest) Hitler used in securing Germany's full objectives.

Economics: Likewise, there were no credible examples found where economic policies alone were successful in engaging foreign governments. But there are good examples of economic

policies that failed to achieve their stated objectives. The Cuban embargo is one such example. It included elements of diplomacy to isolate Castro's Cuba from the international community, as well as a military threat that was applied during the Cuban Missile Crisis. But the embargo of Cuba, initiated during the Cold War in 1961, has failed to topple the communist regime of Fidel Castro in over 37 years, primarily because Cuba countered, using diplomatic, economic, and military relations with communist nations, primarily the USSR, to circumvent the U.S. embargo and to convince other nations of the Organization of American States not to join the embargo. This illustrates how ineffective a solely economic approach can be if not supported by other means, such as diplomacy and/or military.

Military: Military action, like diplomacy and economics, does not have a lengthy history of being unilaterally successful. While war initiation can be undertaken without corresponding diplomatic and economic concerns, war termination usually requires that the diplomatic and economic interests of both sides of the conflict be reconciled.

This is not to be construed as meaning military action alone can never succeed. The military conquests of Jenghiz Khan illustrate that a military force can be successful simply by applying brute force to an opponent. As Jenghiz Khan advanced across Eurasia, his forces used no diplomatic or economic instruments to exert the Mongol influence. The advances of Jenghis Khan may be one of the most pure examples of sheer military force being used in advancing objectives.

Similarly, the 1967 Six Day War demonstrated that the Israeli concept of national security was defense of the country through military strength with a policy absent of a clear boundary between a state of war and one of peace.⁹¹ This, then reflects a very aggressive approach towards the military instrument of foreign policy. The Six Day War was a military approach to achieve a national security objective and position Israel favorably for future negotiations. Therefore, this use of military force provided the conditions from which diplomacy was later used to achieve peace.

Conversely, the use of military force, without a reasonable diplomatic or economic support often has resulted in actual defeat. In August 1990, Saddam Hussein advanced Iraqi forces, the largest, most experienced and best-equipped army in the Middle East and the world's forth largest

army, into Kuwait, fully occupying the country in less than four days.⁹² This initial military victory was accomplished with pure military superiority over the Iraqi opponent. However, Iraq, in neglecting to secure either diplomatic or economic ties with surrounding nations and the international community became an isolated state in which neighbors immediately feared further Iraqi aggression. To counter that threat, the Middle East countries bound together in a coalition with European/Atlantic nations to form an opposing force that forcefully drove Iraq out of Kuwait.

One the finest examples of a failed military first strategy in the Central Asian region was that pursued by Great Britain during the period of the "Great Game." Seeking to protect British investments in India from potential Russian expansion, England was determined to establish a security perimeter around India. This security perimeter, at its peak, extended north of the region known as Afghanistan. But Britain, in trying to secure the boundary was never able to secure peace. Numerous attempts at reaching diplomatic agreements with Central Asian and Afghan leaders failed, ultimately resulting in the First Afghan War (1839-1842) and the eventual British defeat by Afghan tribal forces, including the annihilation of over 16,000 British men, women, and children in just a short seven days during their retreat back to India through the Khyber Pass in 1842.⁹³

Diplomacy (Economics): Diplomacy, when used in association with economic relations has proven to have much better results. Good diplomatic and economic relations with both Canada and Mexico, which border the United States, has resulted in relative stability on the North American continent. Today, the threat of military action between any two of these three North American countries is virtually unthinkable. Additionally, integration of the three countries through diplomatic and economic means continues to reduce the threat of a security problem for the United States. This is best illustrated by implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which reduced international tariff and trade regulations between the three nations. While there remain disagreements over many issues, such as fishing rights in waters off the Canadian shore, these issues are virtually always resolved through diplomatic means. The most recent confrontation was the Canadian blockade of the Alaska State Marine Highway ferry in Prince Rupert, British Columbia in 1995. Canadian fisherman closed the harbor and refused to allow the U.S. registered ferry to depart.

After three days of negotiations, the ferry returned to Alaska without a single threat of military action being suggested by either side. By international law standards, the illegal blockading of the harbor to keep a U.S. registered vessel from returning to the United States could be defined as an act of war. While the economic interests of the both the U.S. and Canadian salmon industry remains in dispute, the strong diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Canada provided the solution and kept U.S. interests from being damaged.

However, diplomacy, backed by economic actions, is not always successful, as seen in the example of U.S. actions intended to stifle Japanese expansionism prior to World War II. As Japan expanded in China, the United States applied diplomatic pressure in an effort to restrain Japanese aggression. Failing to persuade Japan to terminate its expansion plans, the United States applied economic measures, by embargoing oil and steel. By doing this, the U.S. hoped to convince Japan that continued expansion into Southeast Asia and Indo-China was not acceptable to U.S. national interests. To the contrary, Japan viewed this dual diplomatic and economic action as a significant threat to its security, and its access to necessary natural resources. Japan responded by increasing military aggression, eventually directing it towards the United States.

Diplomacy (Military): Diplomacy, when coupled with military support, has often times proven to be a good method for implementing U.S. objectives. As once said by President Theodore Roosevelt, "Speak softly, but carry a big stick." One of the best examples of this policy is in the U.S. approach to the Middle East. As one of the early supporters for establishing the state of Israel, the United States found itself confronted with a long term problem of Arab and Palestinian opposition. Despite this united Arab effort to oppose Israeli statehood; U.S. rejection of the Baghdad Pact; and withdrawal of financing from the Aswan Dam project in Egypt in 1956, which resulted in Egypt nationalizing the Suez Canal and seeking an alliance with the Soviet Union and contributing to two subsequent major wars, the Middle East of today is maturing into a stable region that includes significant U.S. involvement.

In 1958 Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) and urged other Arab states to follow. Conflict occurred in Lebanon and later in Jordan. The United States responded by

sending U.S. forces into Lebanon. Over the next twenty years, the Middle East continued to be volatile, but U.S. willingness to negotiate with Arab nations kept Jordan as a stabilizing force in the region and eventually, following the Yom Kippur War of 1972, enticed Egypt to terminate relations with the USSR and re-establish a relationship with the United States. The Camp David peace agreement, signed in 1978, signified a major diplomatic accomplishment at bringing Egypt and Israel together towards lasting peace, which ultimately enhanced U.S. security in the oil rich Middle East. While it was a diplomatic success, implementation was contingent upon a significant U.S. financial commitment (approximately \$5.0 billion annual between Egypt and Israel, of which over \$3.0 billion is dedicated to military aid).⁹⁴ In a continuation, and strengthening of the Camp David agreement, the 1996 Wye River Accords further advanced peace in the Middle East by initiating the first step in recognizing Palestinian self-governance. These two acts of diplomacy, occurring nearly sixteen years apart, are both closely connected and demonstrate that long term commitments to diplomacy, backed by a proper military component can be successful when both sides seek a peaceful resolution.

Economics (Diplomacy): While economics, as one of the instruments of foreign policy, has not by itself proven to be a highly successful method of engagement, when coupled with diplomatic efforts, economic engagement can be very effective. There are numerous examples of national interaction conducted primarily at the economic level, bolstered by a strong diplomatic relationship that have been successful. Thailand is a good example where economic engagement, with strong diplomatic support, has been beneficial to the United States. But one of the clearest examples is the United States relationship with China. Despite human rights violations and the inability of the United States to diplomatically pressure China to implement democracy, the United States granted "most favored nation" status to China and is actively engaged in a variety of economic programs with China that mutually benefit the economies of both countries. China experienced one of the smallest economic slowdowns during the recent Asian financial crisis and has done well at expanding its markets beyond its traditional trading partners. China may be the rising peer competitor to the United States, but United States policies of economic engagement have proven successful in advancing U.S. interests.

The economic program implemented with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and many states of the Middle East also demonstrate the importance of a strong economic program, supported by diplomatic efforts to achieve U.S. objectives. Prior to the Gulf War, none of the Middle East states allowed a significant U.S. military force to be based on their lands. And after the situation with Iraq has resolved itself, it is highly unlikely that Middle East countries will continue allowing a long term U.S. military presence. Diplomatically, U.S. engagement with Middle East countries had mixed results, but when coupled with economic engagement, the United States has been very successful in maintaining positive relationships with most Middle Eastern countries.

But that is not to infer the economic engagement, even when coupled with a strong diplomatic effort will always be successful. The recent engagement with Russia, following the collapse of the FSU, has demonstrated that some governments may not be receptive to U.S. overtures. In dealing with Russia, it is also prudent to observe that U.S. efforts have not always been set to a positive tone. Russia, while desperate for western hard currency to bolster its failing economy, remains distant from engaging the U.S. and other European countries from a level of equality. While Russia continues to expect to be treated as the superpower it once was it must almost beg for international economic support to keep its government afloat.

Economics (Military): One of the clearest Asian examples of a strong economic policy favorable to United States interests is its relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan has developed into an economically strong country, and despite the recent Asian financial slump, remains one of the stronger economies in the region. The United States conducts a significant amount of trade with Taiwan. Bi-lateral trade agreements between the United States and Taiwan are very favorable to a positive economic environment. Diplomatically, the United States has been unable to leverage Taiwan's position, rather, the United States has steered a careful course of continuing to support the Taiwanese regime, while cultivating relations with China. But, the United States could not sustain a two China policy and eventually accepted China's position that Taiwan and China are not two separate nations. Despite United States willingness to close all U.S. military facilities on the island, the United States remains the primary supplier of military weapons to Taiwanese defense forces and

indirectly provides a military defense umbrella. The United States has consistently stated that reunification with China can not be achieved by military force but must be accomplished through a negotiated agreement.

The use of economic engagement, supported by military action, is not always successful. U.S. engagement of dual containment in regards to Iran is a good example of an economic program that has not achieved United States objectives. Like the Cuban embargo, the U.S. embargo against Iran, while achieving domestic political support, has been losing support internationally, as European nations recognize a value in normalizing relations with Iran to secure lower cost oil and gas product, as well as to reduce current tensions in the region. France has been active in negotiating oil agreements with Iran in direct opposition to the United States led embargo and the United States has been unwilling to take a strong position opposing this engagement. This indicates either a weak position, or a changing position for the United States. In either case, the changing relationship with Iran in world affairs is occurring without the prescribed U.S. desire for a change in government away from the Islamic Republic that overthrew the Shah in 1979.

Military (Diplomacy): When looking at military policy that has been successful with diplomatic support, the Gulf War is an excellent example to cite. The United States, seeking to preserve its national interests following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, successfully used the diplomatic process to establish an international coalition against the Iraqi action. This coalition included most Middle East Arab nations and provided a solid example of multi-national interest against the aggressive actions of a single nation. It demonstrated the value of a strong diplomatic approach. However, the real effort of the Gulf War was the military confrontation, which lasted on the ground just 100 hours. The effective military response of the coalition demonstrated the value of a strong military approach to foreign affairs when the aggressor so clearly violates, not just United States principles and interest, but those of a majority of the region and world.

Of less success, was the United States efforts at providing military action in Somalia. While initially designed as a humanitarian effort to feed the starving population, the mission changed to

establishing civil government and eventually separating and fighting against tribal clans. This strategy failed, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Military (Economics): Military engagement with Turkey has proven to be very effective and in the best interest of the United States. Strategically located at the southwest edge of territory controlled by the FSU, Turkey was an ideal location for basing forces in close proximity to Soviet forces. Mustafa Aydin put it clearly when, in his article Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change, stated "Throughout the Cold War Turkey, as a distant outpost on the European periphery and a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, had formerly based its security and foreign policies exclusively on its alliance ties with the West, particularly with the United States."⁹⁵ In addition, Turkey controlled the Straits of Bosphorus, which divides Europe from Asia and is the only sea-lane access route from the Black Sea, home port of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and transport route for virtually all of the Caspian Sea oil exports. Turkey is a member of NATO and provided the United States with a key location to block Soviet expansion in the Middle East during the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War, the United States stationed forces in Turkey and used Turkey as a vital listening post for eavesdropping on Soviet activities. Until the Cuban Missile crisis, the United States based Jupiter missiles in Turkey. This military support was coupled with strong economic programs which assisted Turkey in remaining economically capable of supporting U.S. interests in the region. The United States provided significant economic incentives to Turkey during this period, in exchange for the ability to station forces in Turkey. Turkey was provided favorable trade relationships and military equipment as part of being a member of NATO. This military and economic relationship has endured since the end of the Cold War, demonstrating the strength of the relationship.

One the reverse side, one of the best examples of active U.S. military engagement, also with a significant economic investment, was with Iran, prior to the fall of the Shah in 1979. For many of the same reasons that the United States engaged Turkey militarily, the United States developed a strong military relationship with Iran, designed to strengthen Iran and position it as a regional hegemon. The United States provided extensive military support, including military sales of some of

the most advanced weapon systems of the 1970's. In short, the United States built up the Iranian military as one of the most powerful in the region to counter Russian military support to Arab nations, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, as well as to provide a fortified front against Russian expansion beyond the Caucasus region and Soviet Central Asia. In terms of providing a strong military fortification in the region, the militarization of Iran was successful. But in terms of long term implications, the United States failed to recognize the significant cultural and political differences that were straining the country. In the 1970's the Shah of Iran was losing internal support. This internal dissension, coupled by a weak economic base that was unable to sustain the highly industrialized and modernized military force, started to fail following the oil price collapse in 1974, causing the Iranian economy to experience a serious recession. This combination of internal economic problems, coupled with the growing dissension within the religious community, eventually resulted in the overthrow of the Shah, with installation of an anti-American radical Islamic fundamentalist regime. The end result was arming a radical government which was highly energized and extremely anti-American, with American weaponry and technology.

While the United States invested heavily in military forces and weaponry in both Turkey and Iran, the end result of each commitment was very different, as Iran turned away from the United States while Turkey as remained a loyal ally and sought greater integration within the European community beyond its defense position in NATO.

Assessment: It is hard to be successful diplomatically if you are a weak country. The ability to pressure or exert influence is really only as effective as the capability to enforce a desired end. Therefore, a country must have either a strong military (i.e. the former Soviet Union) or strong economy (i.e. Japan). The country that will be the most effective diplomatically is the country that is both economically and militarily strong (i.e. United States). Therefore, in determining the most effective policy for engagement with Kazakhstan, diplomacy can be expected to be successful for the United States because of the economic and military ability to pursue the desired end-state. However, in saying that, it is important that the correct primary instrument of foreign affairs be used. For Kazakhstan, a country with a weak, but developing market-based economy and bordering Russia,

which has a historical fear of strong military forces close to their borders, it appears that Kazakhstan would be the most willing to participate on an economic and diplomatic level.

It is easiest to dismiss the military approach as the best potential tool for engagement with Kazakhstan based on the numerous examples of failures in the Central Asian, Middle East, Southwest Asia area already cited in this essay. Similarly, the British approach during the Great Game illustrates the degree to which a powerful, industrialized nation can underestimate the potential for resistance in this region. Bordering Russia and China, with Iran and Afghanistan to the south provides Kazakhstan with an incentive to be cautious in developing military relationships. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is exerting its military power by developing a highly trained and well armed defense force that does not include any Russian presence. Uzbekistan could be a challenger to any potential Kazakhstan efforts at being the dominate power in Central Asia.

It also must be recognized that Kazakhstan is dominated by a leader that has been able to advance the republic based largely on his own popular personality. This personality dominate governance may be satisfactory so long as that leader is inclined towards a favorable relationship with the United States. It remains unknown what any change in leadership may do to the relationships between Kazakhstan and the United States. Having failed at achieving the level of democratic reforms desired by the United States and the OSCE, which charged that the 1999 presidential election fell short of international standards, Kazakhstan has also created a significant obstacle towards greater engagement with the United States. It is only through an established government that is institutionalized, and where it is highly unlikely that a change in leader would have a significant impact on the policies and relationships of the government that the United States can feel comfortable that a strong military approach would be reasonable. There should be no second Iran's based on U.S. engagement policies. Therefore, under any engagement policy, the military option appears to be less relevant than either the economic or diplomatic approach.

The United States has placed the implementation of democratic governance as a threshold criteria for relations with newly independent states. The U.S. contends that is partly why the failure of Kazakhstan to implement free and open elections in January 1999 caused the U.S. to restrain

diplomatic interaction with the republic. This is consistent with the position stated by the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in his 1998 annual country report before the Congressional Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Operations. Secretary Koh stated that "The United States must support democracies over the long haul. We foster the growth of democratic culture wherever it has a chance of taking hold. We focus particularly on providing support for countries in transition, defending democracies under attack, and strengthening the network of established democracies. We do so not just because it is right, but because it is necessary. As history shows, democracies are less likely to fight one another and more likely to cooperate on security issues, economic matters, and legal initiatives. Our own security thus depends upon the expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption, and instability would almost inevitably engulf countries and even regions."⁹⁶

But the question remains: How should the United States promote democracy? Secretary Koh suggested three ways. First, the U.S. must support a free and independent media. Second, The U.S. must support equal participation of all citizens in democratic life. Democracy does not mean the tyranny of the majority. Genuine democracy requires that a government protect the rights of all of its citizens, particularly in states with substantial minorities. Third, democracy must emerge from the desire of individuals to participate in the decisions that shape their lives Unlike dictatorship, democracy is never an imposition; it is always a choice. Secretary Koh noted that, "The slow development of democracy in some newly independent states in 1998 demonstrated that elections should be regarded not as an end in themselves but as the means by which to establish a political system that fosters the growth and self-fulfillment of its citizens by promoting and protecting their political and civil rights."⁹⁷ This assessment carved out the NIS and seems to be defining U.S. relations with these countries, which includes Kazakhstan, by a different, and higher standard, than is applied to many other nations of the world.

Under this philosophy, a nation needs to develop a strong democratic principle, based on the "rule of law" in order to be ready to expand market economics within the country. However, this approach is inconsistent with U.S. engagement practices with many other countries. The United

States conducts relations (diplomatic, economic, and sometimes military) with a host of countries that have a variety of different cultures, governments, and standards than those held by the United States. The United States does this because it is in the U.S. national interest to be globally engaged, seeking to shape a favorable world order towards U.S. interests. And some of the countries the U.S. engages have very poor democratic and human rights records. The most obvious example is China, where the U.S. has granted "most favored nation" trading status to a country that is not democratic and fails to meet basic international human rights expectations. As an example, gross violations of human rights are being perpetrated in the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, in the west of China. The main victims of these violations are the Uighurs, the majority ethnic group among the predominantly Muslim local population.⁹⁸ But some would argue that China, comprised of one-fifth of the world's population, with a veto vote on the U.N Security Council, militarily armed with nuclear weapons and a rapidly developing delivery system, and a potential peer competitor of the U.S. needs to be considered separately, as they are a significant player in world affairs.

Here are just a few other examples, extracted from the testimony of then-Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor John Shattuck before Congress on January 30, 1998 that also shows an inconsistency in the U.S. position on democracy and human rights:

- In Indonesia...We remain deeply concerned, however, by the high levels of violence: inter-communal conflict, the shooting of peaceful demonstrators by security forces, and the terrible attacks on Sino-Indonesians, especially the rapes of ethnic Chinese women and girls during the May riots. The government has not thoroughly investigated these abuses nor has it consistently held perpetrators accountable. We are fully committed to supporting Indonesia's transition to democratic governance, a transition that Secretary Albright has identified as a priority. However, restrictions continued on freedom of association and worker rights, and on allowing the people a real voice in the choice of their leaders. There was little progress on international efforts to find a solution to the problem of East Timor, and security forces continued extra-judicial killings, disappearances and torture. Likewise, Indonesia is currently embroiled in

demonstrations against a repressive regime that has not permitted free democratic elections and has expanded control over regions that have expressed disagreement with control in Jakarta, such as in Timor.

- In Syria, there was little movement toward opening up an autocratic system.
- In Colombia, security forces, paramilitaries and guerrillas committed extra-judicial killings, almost always with impunity. Paramilitaries, at times with the collaboration or acquiescence of the military, were responsible for massacres of unarmed civilians.
- In Egypt (which receives some the highest amounts of foreign assistance from the U.S.) there were numerous human rights abuses, although the record improved somewhat compared to recent years.
- In Turkey, widespread human rights abuses continued, although the new Yilmaz government publicly committed itself to significant reforms to expand freedom of expression and address the problem of torture.
- In India, we continue to be concerned about abuses by government forces fighting separatist insurgencies; but we acknowledge the effective work of the National Human Rights Commission.
- In Russia, the government enacted a restrictive and potential discriminatory law on religion, which has raised questions about Russia's commitment to international agreements honoring freedom of religion. However, high-ranking Russian officials have consistently stated that the law would be applied in a liberal, tolerant manner, thereby preserving religious freedom.
- In Mexico, where the U.S. maintains very close relations, is a co-member of NAFTA, and was the recipient of a significant U.S financial bail-out of the failed peso's in 1994, there was continuing violence in Chiapas -- notably the December massacre of 45

indigenous people -- which casts a shadow over the human rights situation and the degree to which democratic principles are being applied.

- In Saudi Arabia, a close U.S. ally in the military efforts against Iraq and a significant trading partner in the oil rich Persian Gulf region, restrictions on freedoms, including the denial of basic rights to women and the denial of freedom of religion, continued.
- In Pakistan, where the U.S. has been actively engaged, Christians and Ahmadis continue to be persecuted by Islamic extremists.
- Finally, in 1998, the situation facing women in Afghanistan represented perhaps the most severe abuse of women's human rights in the world today. The Taliban's blatant abuse of women included public beatings, devastating disregard for the physical and psychological health of women and girls, drastically limited access to medical services and hospitals, and severe cutbacks on access to education. Women cannot work outside the home, except in extremely limited circumstances in the medical field. These problems were further exacerbated by the fierce civil war, which left many women as their family's sole breadwinner and forced many to beg on the streets to feed their children.

Implementation of U.S. policy is always tailored. The approach used towards Kazakhstan can be crafted so that advancing democracy remains a significant and primary goal of the United States. Democratic governance is a desirable end state and should be encouraged by the United States. It is the proper long term objective. The position that the U.S. should not be actively engaged with a nation which has not institutionalized democratic principles, or eradicated human rights violations, is idealistic in a very dynamic world. So the question remains as to which instrument of foreign policy can be most effective as the prime means for achieving the desired end-state in Central Asia and with Kazakhstan.

The first portion of this essay developed the position that U.S. engagement in Central Asia, and specifically with the Republic of Kazakhstan, was important to the United States. The U.S.

Engagement Strategy Matrix provided examples of successful, and unsuccessful, means of employing U.S. foreign policy. However, a connection still must be made between the instruments of foreign policy available to the United States and a proper application for Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

The United States engagement in international relations has evolved into a Country Team concept, which was first embodied in law under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, requiring the President "to assure coordination among representatives of the United States Government in each country, under the leadership of the United States Diplomatic Mission."⁹⁹ As a result of this change in the law, United States efforts at engaging a foreign nation changed from individual programs administered by numerous individual U.S. agencies, to a more coordinated approach under the leadership of the Department of State. This point is important to this analysis, as it provides the framework from which a revised engagement policy can be implemented. This will be addressed in the next section of this essay.

ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS

The idea of engaging a developing nation, like Kazakhstan, to bridge the chasm between the many diversified political interests of the United States in Russia, Asia, the Middle East, and across the Transcaspian region is consistent with United States practices of the past. William Kunzweiler makes a solid argument for increased U.S. engagement in Central Asia in support of U.S. national interests that pertain, as much to adjacent powers (Russia,, China, and Iran) as to the national interest of the actual Central Asian republics. His position is that the United States must be pro-active in Central Asia, including militarily, to replace Russia.¹⁰⁰ This essay examined that prospect from a perspective that the United States not take a dominant (imperialist) role in the region, but rather be actively engaged with one of the regions strongest emerging republics, Kazakhstan, to maintain regional stability and advance a favorable regional order. In doing so, Kazakhstan could provide the conduit to assist Russia in ultimately achieving economic and political stabilization, while concurrently limiting the opportunity for China to expand its political sphere of influence into Central Asia, containing Iranian and radical Islamic fundamentalist expansionism, and creating greater market-driven economic opportunities for all Central Asian republics.

The 1998 NSS emphasizes an integrated approach to foreign policy implementation. "To effectively shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of potential threats and crises, diplomacy, military force, our other foreign policy tools and our domestic preparedness efforts must be clearly coordinated. We must retain a strong foreign assistance program and an effective diplomatic corps if we are to maintain American leadership."¹⁰¹ However, compliance with that strategy leaves room for improvement in Central Asia, where the U.S. has not developed a comprehensive, integrated approach.

This essay evaluated what strategy towards engaging Kazakhstan best advances potential U.S. interests in the region. Paul H. Hebert states in his article "Consideration for US Strategy in Post-Communist Eurasia, that "A return to anything like the Cold War in Europe--for example, a cold peace between an enlarged NATO and a brooding, partially reintegrated, nuclear armed, and uncooperative Greater Russia--would be a tremendous strategic setback."¹⁰² Accepting that

premise, than it is reasonable to conclude that the United States should engage a foreign policy with Russia's closest and historically long term neighbors in Central Asia.

In further advancing the position of U.S. global leadership, Zalmay Khalilzad argues that the United States should seek to retain its leadership role and to preclude the rise of a global rival as the best long-term guiding principle and vision. He maintains that, by doing this the global environment would be more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law.¹⁰³ The U.S. Department of State has also maintained that these three principles are of significant national interest. Khalilzad further argues that there are nine principles the United States should adhere to in order to meet that objective. Without belaboring each of the issues, it is noteworthy that two of them state that the United States should 1) hedge against re-imperialism of Russia, and 2) discourage Chinese expansionism. Khalilzad sees these two powers as potential threats to an ability of the United States to secure a global leadership role. And with regards to Russia, one of the solutions he suggests is that consolidating Ukrainian, Kazakh, and Uzbek independence should be a primary U.S. objective.¹⁰⁴

The U.S. has stated that the primary objective of United States foreign policies in Central Asia is to ensure the newly independent republics remain independent. This primary goal is followed by the objective of instilling democratic government that subscribe to international standards of the "rule of law." However, others argue that placing too much emphasis on democratic governance may be counterproductive to advancing U.S. interests in a region previously dominated by central controlled, authoritarian governments. This is best illustrated by a quote from Dastan Sarygulov, a parliament deputy and president of the Kirghizaltin, Kyrgystan's chief producer of gold. "In the past seven years we got to know Western democracy. It made greater Russia a begger...It brought war to Tajikistan. People don't need such democracy."¹⁰⁵ While it may be debatable that this quote is accurate in relating the events in Central Asia to a U.S. policy of democratization, it clearly illustrates the perception of U.S. efforts in a region where so recently democratic principles were barely understood. Therefore, a strong position can be presented that the short term engagement with Central Asian republics should become more tolerant of current democratic accomplishments,

engaging those leaders that have the greatest probability of success in preserving independence, continuing to provide avenues by which the eventual transformation to more democratic government becomes appealing. There are strong examples on each side of the argument, but using the previously identified *U.S. Engagement Strategy Matrix*, it would appear that the economic instrument, supported by a strong diplomatic efforts, may be the most effective means to accomplish that objective.

U.S. predominance towards democracy in Kazakhstan has created a rift between the two governments that has significantly dampened diplomatic engagement. Placing too significant an emphasis on the national election, the United States may further cause Kazakhstan to turn towards Russia, Iran, or even China. This is even more pronounced by the earlier observation that leadership in the region is so dependent upon the personality and strength of the individual leader and less guided by national democratic institutions. In actuality, U.S. efforts in the political arena may be better served by working with the existing Kazakhstani leadership rather than providing a basis for Kazakhstan leaders to seek alternative relationships. Furthermore, to apply a more punitive engagement policy with Kazakhstan because it has not fully embodied democratic principles and the rule of law is inconsistent with U.S. practices with many other nations of the world. Pushing Kazakhstan too hard in pursuing democratic positions it is not ready to accept, may only result in driving Kazakhstan closer to Russia. Diplomatically, and with a 5,000 km common border with Russia, Kazakhstan understands that it has an alternative to U.S. pressure, unless there are returns to Kazakhstan that entice the leadership to be desirous of moving in a democratic fashion towards U.S. objectives.

That leaves economic engagement as a key factor in pursuing positive relations with Kazakhstan. Linking economic policies to diplomatic policies, with economic programs being the leading instrument for engaging Kazakhstan has a clear benefit to the United States.

By advancing a strong economic policy, while reserving the right to apply diplomatic pressure in areas where democracy and the "rule of law" are not being implemented to the degree desired by the U.S., allows the U.S. flexibility to continue engaging developing nations in a direction

favorable to U.S. interests. The most clear example of this approach has been the U.S. "China Policy." The U.S. continues to express discontent with Chinese democratic practices, the rule of law, and human rights, while continuing to promote economic programs with China.

The 1999 Congressional Presentation on Foreign Affairs, prepared by the Department of States, identifies an operational goal to "Develop institutions and mechanisms to mediate disputes and to provide assistance in addressing underlying conditions that could lead to instability."¹⁰⁶ Here, the Department of State clarifies that U.S. involvement should be considered only sparingly, if U.S. interests dictate, and that "...the U.S. should be prepared to use prestige, authority, and resources to intervene accordingly."¹⁰⁷ In accomplishing that objective, diplomatic engagement remains a valuable tool in potentially bolstering Kazakhstan as a regional leader, but it leaves open the opportunity for economic engagement.

Economic relations is a complex means for implementing national policies. It involves a complicated web of both government and private sector financial investment. The United States has supported market reforms in Central Asia, designed to stabilize the existing governments, but also to contribute to a stronger global economy. Under the Partnership for Freedom program, the United States has intensified assistance programs and stimulated investment-oriented initiatives, with a special focus on trade and investment opportunities for U.S. firms. Since 1992, the United States has provided \$185 million to furnish alternative, civilian employment opportunities within Kazakhstan to retrain and reemploy former Soviet weapons specialists living in Kazakhstan.¹⁰⁸

The United States is also active in pursuing efforts promoting economic growth carried out with international organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank. To further bolster Kazakhstans economy, the United States could increase its efforts at securing membership within the World Trade Organization (WTO) for Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan market development is hampered by its close economic relationship with Russia. In fact, this is a primary obstacle with Kazakhstan membership in the WTO, as Russia is not a WTO member. Kazakhstan must establish more independence from the failing Russian economy and economic practices before it is capable of becoming a WTO member. This issue is exactly what the United States economic approach towards Kazakhstan could address.

Engagement with Kazakhstan towards this end could be valuable for the following reasons: 1) To move Kazakhstan away from such close economic dependency on Russia; 2) To move Kazakhstan closer to United States economic interests, and 3) To move Kazakhstan towards WTO membership. In addition, the strengthening of U.S. - Kazakhstan bi-lateral financial agreements would assist Kazakhstan in moving away from such close economic ties with Russia.

One of the objectives in the 1999 Regional Program Plan for Russia and the NIS is to work with the governments of the Caucasus and Central Asia to develop Eurasian transportation and communications network. However, U.S. actions in support of this effort have been meager. For example, it was Turkish telecom that was initially the most proactive investor in Central Asian telecommunications systems, followed by Korea Telecom. Likewise, in transportation infrastructure development, the United States has lagged behind other countries in providing support for development. U.S. support has been limited, as seen by the recent airport improvement projects at Bishkek, Kyrgystan and Astana, Kazakhstan, which has been funded by Japanese investment firms, and the development of the Almaty, Kazakhstan and Tashkent, Uzbekistan airports which have been funded primarily by German backed firms. In reality, while policy statements indicate that U.S. investment in Central Asia is an economic approach towards implementing U.S. national interest, little business development and lending programs have been established. The U.S. International Trade Administration has established a Commercial Service office in Kazakhstan, dedicated to helping U.S. companies enter and expand their opportunities for investing in Kazakhstan through business counseling, trade promotion, and advocacy of US interests, but the list of major firms operating in Kazakhstan is limited to just a couple dozen.¹⁰⁹

The 1998 NSS focuses on economic expansion as a significant tool for pursuing U.S. interests. But proactive economic programs are lacking. An example of one of the primary focuses that could be implemented to support this object by the U.S. is retooling manufacturing plants to build arms for Russia equipped forces for export. Another example is the need for a trade credits program to enhance the production of goods that are needed in Russia and could be profitable to Kazakhstani business. In relations with the United States, providing tariff relief would be beneficial,

as well as implementing a modified program to strengthen the Kazakhstan *tenges* against the Russian *ruble*. Finally, offering a "Marshall-like" plan in return for US investment opportunities would directly benefit the republic and, as was seen in the post World War II period, could provide long term economic strength to the region.

The United States did increase financial support to Kazakhstan following their agreement to dismantle the nuclear arsenal based in the country and ratification of the Start II treaty. However, the majority of U.S. financial support was to the military sector to support the dismantling program. While that effort was a very legitimate investment opportunity, subsequent financial aid to Kazakhstan has been minimal. In fact, U.S. aid to all countries of the FSU between 1990- and 1993 was less than one-fifth the amount the United States provided to Mexico in a single year, during the peso crisis of 1994. Outside of military assistance programs, United States economic engagement with Kazakhstan has actually been minimal.

But that is not to be construed as meaning that no military engagement should occur. The United States is already militarily engaged in Kazakhstan. In 1997 the United States participated in a joint operation with several Central Asian republics in the joint exercise CENTRAZBAT 97. In this exercise, United States forces conducted a joint airborne assault exercise within Kazakhstan. In preparation for the exercise, Central Asian troops trained in the United States and at the initiation of the exercise, forces were airlifted from the United States directly into Kazakhstan. Clearly, this exercise was a deliberate test of the independence of the Central Asian republics from Russian domination. It was repeated again in 1998 and Russia did not make the issue a point of confrontation.

The United States was a leader in the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Proposed in 1994, PfP is a NATO sponsored organization which is designed to provide a strong link between NATO and the newly independent states of the FSU, as well as some of Europe's traditionally neutral states.¹¹⁰ In 1997 U.S. Presidential Determinations were signed making eight of the NIS, including Kazakhstan, eligible to receive grant Foreign Military Financing

(FMF) for the first time.¹¹¹ This is in addition to the International Military Education and Training (IMET) opportunities and support for DoD exercises, conferences, and other PfP events.

While military policies generally relate to programs conducted by the U.S. active duty forces, the State Partnership Program (SPP), initiated in 1992 as a component of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, is conducted by the National Guard. The key component of the SPP is to develop "constructive military relationships with developing countries under non-confrontational conditions."¹¹² Kazakhstan is a participant in the SPP, partnered with the Arizona National Guard. The Arizona National Guard, interaction with Kazakhstan has been limited, however, the agreement of Kazakhstan to become a SPP participant signifies a much greater intention of the Republic of Kazakhstan to associate with the United States while concurrently distancing themselves from Russian dominance within the security environment.¹¹³ In developing a stronger military relationship with Kazakhstan, increased relationships through the SPP program would be beneficial. John Grove points out that one of the greatest benefits related to implementing the NSS is that the SPP provides "opportunities to observe firsthand the conditions that are achievable when democracy and market economies are at work and when both take precedence over the military."¹¹⁴ One of the direct benefits of the SPP program is the fact that states National Guard personnel are conducting the training programs and military-to-military programs under SPP. These individuals bring a somewhat unique perspective to the host nation in demonstrating the viability of the "*Citizen-Soldier*" concept which is often missing from countries where large federal forces dominated the military structure. It is logical to conclude that Kazakhstan would be receptive to a greater SPP program that is based on defense security rather than a large standing army for external use.

The USCENTCOM end state for Central Asia is to have a region at peace. To a greater degree, it could be argued that U.S. interests would best be achieved if Central Asia were to be transformed into an economically vibrant region which is free-market oriented. To accomplish this objective lends itself to a much greater economic policy than a military policy. USCENTCOM has a politico-military office. This office melds the political and military tenants of foreign affairs towards a directed U.S. policy that has military elements supporting the diplomatic leadership of the country.

Using the premise that economic development is the most appropriate instrument for U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan, this concept should be expanded to include the economic factor of foreign affairs.

This essay has concluded that a greater economic program could provide the greatest opportunity for transforming Central Asia and Kazakhstan towards market economics and democracy, basic global goals of the NSS. This can best be achieved by aggressive development of the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves, but only at the time that oil and gas prices can justify the investment requirements. Therefore, oil policy is not so much driven by diplomatic and military concerns, as it is by the marketplace.

To provide a bridge in time for the right opportunity for oil and gas development, economic engagement with Kazakhstan can be achieved in other ways. Senator Bob Brownback, R-Kansas, has sponsored legislation which offers a framework for a broad U.S. engagement with republics of Central Asia. Known as the "Silk Road Strategy Act," the legislation encourages trade and infrastructure projects and supports foreign aid for projects that result in the development of more democratic republics.¹¹⁵ The bill, first introduced in 1997 was reintroduced on March 10, 1999 in the U.S. Senate and has the support of the Clinton Administration.¹¹⁶ The rebuilding of infrastructure that supports industry development is essential for Kazakhstan to recover its manufacturing and production base. Legislation like the "Silk Road Strategy Act" can provide the economic stimulation so necessary to instill a desire to pursue democratic principles.

It may also be wise for the U.S. to implement a program similar to the Japanese OECF program of loans to specific infrastructure projects in return for future guarantees of Kazakhstan production. While it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would need direct imports of Kazakhstan products, the ability to have U.S. connections to Kazakhstan exports allowing the U.S. to gain advantages with neighboring countries, such as Russia. Under this scheme, the U.S. could underwrite infrastructure programs, such as the reconstruction of obsolete military production facilities into prefabrication plants to produce products needed by Russia. In return, the U.S. would have a financial interest which could be used to negotiate issues with Russia.

CONCLUSION

Echoing the words of Henry Kissinger, cited at the beginning of this essay, and bringing Mr. Kissinger's ideas into contemporary perspective with regards to the end of the Cold War, General Henry H. Shelton has stated that "Without question, the instability which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union has placed a premium on U.S. leadership. As the only remaining global power and as a coalition leader in international organizations such as NATO, the United States is uniquely positioned to influence world affairs in ways that benefit both the United States and the international community as a whole. The prudent use of military force, in concert with the economic, political, and diplomatic instruments of national power, is a central aspect of US efforts to shape the international environment and to encourage stability wherever vital national interest are at stake. By remaining engaged, the United States is able to exert its influence to prevent crises from escalating, deter major wars, and help avoid the tragedies and conflicts that marred the twentieth century."¹¹⁷

Accepting General Shelton's position, and applying this philosophy to Central Asia, Jed Snyder correctly states "From a strictly military and security perspective, Kazakhstans relationship with Russia elevates Central Asia to a higher strategic level for the United States."¹¹⁸ But he also observes that "Washington is not inclined to make a commitment to Central Asian economic development, particularly when the potential for crises in other regions of the former Soviet Union are likely to more directly impact U.S. interests."¹¹⁹ Not being engaged economically would be a bad decision, because direct involvement in the economic development of Kazakhstan and other republics of Central Asia will be a critical determinate on whether Russia reemerges as a hostile adversary to U.S. interests; whether Chinese influence expands westward; whether Islamic fundamentalism can be placed in check between Europe and Asia; and whether the future development of this natural resource rich region will be favorable to United States long term global interests. It is more probable that just the opposite is true, that engagement with Central Asia, and specifically through its economically and politically strongest republic can help shape the region in terms favorable to United States national interests.

Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich stated in a presentation before the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, that the United States has four key issues for accomplishing its diplomatic agendas in Central Asia. First was the formation of democratic political institutions. Second was market economic reforms. Third, was cooperation among regional countries and greater integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Forth, was to establish responsible security policies.¹²⁰ While these four key points accurately characterize the areas of interest to the United States for advancing relations within Central Asia and with Kazakhstan, this paper has attempted to analyze which of the instruments of foreign affairs would be the most effective in achieving these goals.

The establishment of democratic principles is by far the overarching objective of the United States in preserving a favorable world order and ensuring stability within the region, but diplomacy alone can not accomplish that objective. Kazakhstan, like most other republics of Central Asia remains a relatively poor country. But it has a strong leader which has carefully guided the republic through the initial years of independence from the FSU, albeit with less than commendable democratic practices. In pressuring Kazakhstan to advance democracy, the U.S. must also understand that Kazakhstan needs to have the capability of surviving and the ability to exert its independence through self-reliance. This can only be accomplished through market reforms and the institutionalization of market economics. Therefore, this essay has illustrated how the United States could improve its abilities to lead the Kazakhstan government towards a more democratic system by structuring a program which provides tangible economic incentives for achieving these objectives. If the will is there, the means are available, and an outcome favorable to United States interest is surly possible.

Paul Hebert identifies five fundamentals for U.S. foreign policy in regards to the NIS. The first is that Russia is the key to success. The analysis presented in this essay clearly supports that assertion, that for the U.S. to be successful in exploiting its superpower diplomatic, economic and military strength in Central Asia, the interests of Russia must be considered. But Mr. Hebert continues by asserting that the U.S. must accept that there will be some degree of reintegration of the

former Soviet republics with Russia and that the U.S. should not reflexively oppose such an evolution.¹²¹ To the contrary, it is highly probable that most NIS republics will continue to strive for independence from Russia and in doing so present the U.S. with options which can be used to increase regional influence while concurrently easing some of the concerns the U.S. has over WMD and access to oil. This essay has attempted to provide such an analysis: An analysis of how the United States, by being more proactive in developing a comprehensive economic foreign policy with Kazakhstan, can provide the basis for Eurasian security in a direction that is favorable to U.S. interests.

In her publication, Central Asia: A new Great Game, Dianne Smith states that "America has no vital interests in Central Asia, nor will it assume responsibility for Central Asia's security."¹²² This essay also concludes that U.S. interests in Central Asia are not vital, but rather are potential national interests that can be developed so long as the United States provides strong, visionary leadership towards long term regional stability and prosperity. Ms. Smith continues by saying that Central Asia, in the best case, may develop into "an independent bloc of market democracies, based perhaps around Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, would succeed in playing off the United States, Russia, China, and other neighbors to maintain a balance of power on its own terms."¹²³ This is an end objective highly desirable to the United States, as it allows for regional independence from Russian, Chinese, and other hostile influences by advancing democratic principles and market economies. Therefore, to achieve this objective, this essay would conclude that active US engagement with Kazakhstan is appropriate.

U.S. leadership in Central Asia is critical if long term U.S. interests are to be realized. Beyond the need for access to oil and gas and beyond the security issues of WMD and non-proliferation, Central Asia has the potential of contributing, either positively or negatively, towards the United States desires for world democratic countries that foster strong market economies. How the United States deals with Kazakhstan now will have long term implications on how that region of the world relates to United States interests in the future. If the United States becomes proactive with an economic policy that steers Kazakhstan in a manner favorable to United

States interests, than it is highly likely that Chinese political influence in the region will not spread; Iranian radical fundamentalism will not spread; Central Asia will remain an independent, stable region with developing economic markets tied to western interests; Russia will benefit from an economically strong neighbor that maintains close relations; and Kazakhstan will slowly develop as a true democratic republic. These are the objectives that can be achieved with a strong United States economic program towards Kazakhstan.

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